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In this dissertation, I articulate a theory of identity suspicion, informed by research on attribution 
theory’s discounting principle (Kelley, 1971) and on suspicious mindsets (Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 
1990). Identity suspicion is a function of concealable identity and social environments that 
stigmatize (i.e., socially mark; Brekhus, 1996) the concealable identity. Such stigmatizing 
environments incentivize concealing (i.e., closeting) the marked identity. The awareness of this 
incentivized closet creates suspicion around actors’ claims to the contrasting unmarked identity 
because these claims have at least two plausible causes (i.e., self-protection or authentic self-
expression). To resolve their suspicion, people become close observers of each other’s behaviors, 
looking for attributes that are socially coded as cues of the contrasting marked identity. Where 
observed, these attributes augment the identity suspicion produced by actors’ claims to the 
contrasting unmarked identity. 
Across nine experimental studies (N = 2467), I found consistent support for my theory of 
identity suspicion. Participants were more suspicious of an actor’s claim to an unmarked 
concealable identity (e.g., being straight) when he was situated in an environment that 
stigmatized (vs. affirmed) the contrasting concealable identity (e.g., homophobic environment 
stigmatizing being gay). As expected, observers in the stigmatizing environment reported more 
identity suspicion when I described the actor as having certain attributes stereotypically 
associated with the stigmatized identity. However, even when the actor’s attributes were 
stereotypically associated with the contrasting non-stigmatized identity, observers in the identity-




In Studies 4a-5, I found that observers’ perception of the actor’s motivation to conceal 
behaviors or attributes stereotyped as cues of the stigmatized identity mediated the social 
environmental effect on identity suspicion. These results support my theorizing and suggest 
observers intuitively recognize how identity-stigmatizing environments create secondary closets 
in which, to avoid suspicion they possess the stigmatized identity, everyone is incentivized to 
conceal behaviors and attributes stereotyped as cues of the stigmatized identity. 
Keywords: identity suspicion, suspicious mindsets, discounting principle, attribution 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
Closets breed suspicion. When an identity is both socially stigmatized and concealable, 
people are incentivized to hide it. Sometimes they will do this by claiming the contrasting, non-
stigmatized concealable identity (e.g., claiming to be straight to hide that one is gay). Ironically, 
where concealment of a stigmatized identity is strongly incentivized, anyone’s assertion of the 
contrasting non-stigmatized identity has the potentital to elicit suspicion. This suspicion arises 
because such identity claims have more than one possible explanation—authentic self-expression 
or self-protection—which results in attributional ambiguity. To disambiguate such identity 
attributions, people become close readers of one another’s behavior, searching for outward signs 
that may indicate the other’s concealed membership in the stigmatized group. This 
hypervigilance often involves attending to behaviors and attributes socially coded as identity 
cues—and thereby stereotypically associated with the stigmatized group—and using them as 
signifiers of “true”1 identity (see Dean, 2014). In this way, people infer identity from behavior, 
discounting explicit identity claims. I label this phenomenon identity suspicion. 
To illustrate one instantiation of identity suspicion, consider the classic murder mystery 
(stigmatized concealable identity: murderer). Characters claim innocence and provide alibis 
(explicit claims of contrasting, non-stigmatized concealable identity), while participants discount 
these protestations and search instead for clues that will reveal the murderer’s identity. The 
character(s) that is(are) guilty is finite, but to participants attempting to solve the crime, the 
 
1 The notion of true identity is epistemologically situated within a post-positivist tradition (Crotty, 1998) and reflects 
Pepper's (1942) articulation of a formistic world hypothesis. I assert such approaches to identity are misguided 
because they erroneously assume an objective criterion against which to test the validity of self-theories (Berzonsky, 
1994) and worse, situate expertise of identity within observers rather than actors. Nonetheless, I recognize that 
observers’ perceptions of actors constrain the latter’s autonomy and ways of being in the world (Hopkins & 
Blackwood, 2011; McNamara & Reicher, 2019), making them an important phenomenon to study. Here and 




possibilities are infinite. All characters are suspects. A litany of otherwise inconsequential 
observations can suddenly take on new meaning as potential clues to the murderer’s (or 
murderers’) identity. Similarly, when group identity is stigmatized and concealable—motivating 
group members to “closet” their membership—previously insignificant behaviors take on new 
meanings as potential signs of “true” identity. In this fashion, closets tend to produce “the 
multiplication of signs” (Beaver, 1981, p. 105).  
In this paper, I draw on attribution theory (Gilbert, 1998; Kelley, 1971) and suspicious 
mindsets (Fein, 1996; Fein & Hilton, 1994; Fein et al., 1990) to propose a theory of identity 
suspicion. I suggest that identity suspicion illuminates a part of the process by which societies 
become obsessed with certain concealable stigmatized identities and go to great lengths to 
determine who secretly holds these identities. Examples of this process include the hunt for 
hidden Communist agents under McCarthyism in the US during the late 1940s to 1950s 
(Schrecker, 1998); the Salem, Massachusetts witch trials from 1692-1693 (Wallenfeldt, 2019); 
and, the Spanish Inquisition in early modern Spain, which sought to determine whether converts 
to Catholicism were secretly maintaining their Jewish faith (Netanyahu, 1995). In articulating my 
theory of identity suspicion, I will focus on the role of social environments in promoting or 
attenuating social climates of suspicion. Through this analysis, I will conclude that identity 
suspicion arises not from individual bias, but from suspicious mindsets triggered by formally 
correct applications of attribution theory’s discounting principle. I experimentally test several 
hypotheses arising from this proposition by examining the effect of social environments on 
people’s propensity to form suspicions of a person’s identity claim. Ultimately, my data lead us 
to conclude that when communities stigmatize a concealable identity, this stigma drives 
members of the group into the metaphorical closet. The existence of this closet, in turn, fuels 
 
 3 
rampant suspicion that nearly anyone might secretly bear the stigma. As Erikson (1966) 
intriguingly observed: “[those] who fear witches soon find themselves surrounded by them” (p. 
22).  
Social Markedness 
To aid in my explanation of identity suspicion, I draw on Brekhus's (1996, 1998, 2003) 
articulation of social markedness. At its simplest, social markedness describes the process of 
socially marking certain identities as deviating from the norm by actively drawing attention to 
some “non-normative” characteristic of the identity (e.g., being gay in a predominantly straight 
society).2 By marking an identity, a contrasting  “unmarked” identity is automatically (and 
passively) defined by the lack of the marked characteristic (e.g., being straight in a 
predominantly straight society). These two identities are then paired in people’s minds as 
contrasting sides of a binary. Of critical importance to the notion of social markedness is “the 
ways the ‘social mind’ actively perceives one side of a contrast while ignoring the other side as 
epistemologically unproblematic” (1996, p. 500). That is, marked identities receive 
disproportionate social attention while unmarked identities go relatively unnoticed. This is seen 
in the disproportionate amount of social attention that people who identify, or are perceived as, 
gay receive on account of their sexuality, relative to the attention directed at people who identify, 
or are perceived as, straight. In heteronormative society, being gay is a marked identity while 
being straight is its “epistemologically unproblematic” contrast (p. 500).  
In my work, I sometimes use the terms “marked/unmarked” interchangeably with 
“stigmatized/non-stigmatized,” respectively. This choice is deliberate and reflects (a) the reality 
 
2 Please note my use of “non-normative” is intended only to reflect Brekhus's (1996) articulation of social 
markedness distinguishing identities that differ from the norm. If heterosexuality is taken to be the sexuality norm, 
then by Brekhus’s account, any other sexuality is non-normative. As such, my use of “non-normative” should not be 
interpreted as a statement on the moral or normative “correctness” of either or any sexuality.  
 
 4 
that (un)marked identities in my theory of identity suspicion are also (non-)stigmatized identities 
(though not all marked identities are necessarily stigmatized identities; Brekhus, 1996), and (b) 
the centrality to identity suspicion of socially perceived identity binaries (e.g., gay/straight: 
though not the only two sexualities that exist, sexuality is generally perceived in this binaristic 
way; Elizabeth, 2013; Leck, 2000; Morgan & Davis-Delano, 2016; Waites, 2005). 
The Attributional Logic of the Closet 
Identity suspicion is a function of concealable identity and social environments that 
stigmatize (i.e., socially mark) the concealable identity. As outlined in my introduction, such 
stigmatizing social environments incentivize concealing (i.e., closeting) the marked identity. The 
awareness of this incentivized closet creates suspicion around claims to the contrasting unmarked 
identity because these claims have multiple plausible causes (i.e., self-protection vs. authentic 
self-expression). To resolve this suspicion, people become close observers of each other’s 
behaviors, looking for attributes that are socially coded as cues of the contrasting marked (and 
concealable) identity. Where observed, these attributes augment the suspicion created by the 
stigmatizing social environment and, in turn, amplify the identity suspicion produced by explicit 
claims to the contrasting unmarked identity.  
To better understand how identity claims, behavioral cues, and social environments can 
interactively produce identity suspicion, I must consider attribution theory and the discounting 
principle. Rooted in the logical approach to attribution, the discounting principle stems from 
Heider’s articulation of the need to “factor out extraneous environmental influences on … 
performance … to estimate [an] actor’s [traits]” (Gilbert, 1998, p. 92), and Jones and Davis's 
(1965) focus on external factors’ influence(s) on behavior. Formally articulated by Kelley 
(1971), the discounting principle states that “the role of a given cause in producing a given effect 
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is discounted if other plausible causes are also present” (p. 8). Where discounting is warranted, 
certainty of the “true” cause is diminished, and attributions are made with less confidence. 
Despite this attributional ambiguity, though, observers try to disambiguate their attribution 
through various means, such as searching for unifying explanations (Asch, 1946; Marchand & 
Vonk, 2005; Vonk, 1998), applying various attributional rules (Fein, 1996; Jones & Davis, 
1965), or taking into consideration contextual cues (Heider, 1958; Marchand & Vonk, 2005; 
Vonk, 1998) and/or psychological contstraints (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In sum, observers 
strive to form coherent impressions of others, even when the process of doing so is complex and 
requires they discount certain plausible causes of, impressions of, or inferences about an actor’s 
behavior or disposition.  
My analysis of the emergence of identity suspicion in situations where concealable 
identities are stigmatized is fully consistent with previous theory and research on attribution 
theory and suspicious mindsets. Classic work on attribution theory indicates that when “a reason 
of high assumed social desirability” can account for an actor’s behavior, observers will doubt 
whether the behavior reflects that actor’s authentic characteristics (Kelley, 1971, p. 10). When a 
concealable identity is stigmatized, this creates a strong social-desirability pressure for anyone 
who possesses that identity to publicly disclaim it. Observers’ awareness of this pressure should 
lead them to apply the discounting principle and question the authenticity of other people’s 
claims to the contrasting non-stigmatized identity.  
Despite the logic behind the discounting principle, people frequently fail to apply it. This 
failure is known as the fundamental attribution error or correspondence bias (e.g., Gilbert, 1998; 
Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ichheiser, 1943) and it is one of the most robust findings in attribution 
theory (Gilbert, 1998; Ross, 1977). While fairly automatic and notoriously difficult to overcome 
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(Berry & Frederickson, 2015), research by Fein suggests that when “[observers] actively 
entertain multiple, plausibly rival, hypotheses about the motives or genuineness of a person’s 
behavior” (1996, p. 1165), they become suspicious of the person’s “true” motive. This suspicious 
mindset, in turn, promotes the effortful cognitive processing that helps observers overcome the 
fundamental attribution error and invoke the discounting principle. As such, observers in 
identity-stigmatizing environments should recognize the “multiple, plausibly rival” (p. 1165) 
motives behind other people’s claims to a non-stigmatized identity and question the authenticity 
of these claims.  
Although the phenomenon of identity suspicion can be derived directly from classic 
attribution theory, to my knowledge, this specific implication of attribution theory has not 
previously been examined. Indeed, previous attribution theory and research have largely focused 
on observers’ inferences about others’ personality traits, attitudes, abilities, and motivations, but 
have largely neglected to apply attribution theory to analyses of observers’ inferences about 
others’ self-professed identities. Extending attribution theory to interpretations of people’s 
identity presentations in situations of identity stigmatization reveals problematic social 
consequences of people’s formally correct use of the discounting principle. This extension 
contrasts previous work, which has largely focused on the problems that relate to observers’ 
underutilization of the discounting principle. This previous research has extensively documented 
how perceivers’ underutilization of the discounting principle leads them to exaggerate how 
closely people’s beliefs, attitudes, or feelings align with their overt behavior (Gilbert & Malone, 
1995), which contributes to a variety of social problems (e.g., Berry & Frederickson, 2015). My 
analysis shifts the focus to explore how—in the context of identity stigmatization—observers’ 
formally correct application of the discounting principle may also contribute to social problems, 
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specifically by fueling people’s suspicions of each other’s identity claims. Additionally, I 
examine how this identity suspicion is perceived to influence individuals’ suppression of 
interests and feelings stereotypically associated with the marked identity to avoid suspicion that 
they secretly hold it. My work thus extends research on attribution theory and the discounting 
principle into the relatively understudied domain of identity attribution and documents ways that 
formally correct attributions in identity-oppressive environments might exacerbate problematic 
social climates, specifically by fueling climates of identity suspicion. Indeed, my analysis 
suggests that climates of rampant identity suspicion can emerge from purely rational attributional 
processes, as opposed to other accounts that might assume that such suspicions reflect irrational, 
paranoid thought processes (Demos, 2004; Erikson, 1966; Hofstadter, 2008; Robins & Post, 
1997).  
To illustrate the discounting principle at play in identity suspicion, imagine a man with 
attributes socially coded as gay, such as being a hairdresser (Madon, 1997). If observers learn 
that he explicitly claims to be straight, but also that he is a hairdresser, his identity will be 
somewhat ambiguous to them. This ambiguity results from the contradictory inferences primed 
by his profession (i.e., gay) and his explicit identity claim (i.e., straight). To disambiguate these 
inconsistent inferences, observers can look to the man’s social environment to contextualize his 
behavior (Heider, 1958; Marchand & Vonk, 2005; Vonk, 1998). When considering that 
homophobic environments stigmatize and oppress non-straight sexualities, thereby incentivizing 
people to self-present as straight, a formally correct application of the discounting principle 
would lead observers to regard the man’s claim to be straight with suspicion. This suspicion 
reflects the possibility that the man’s claim is motivated by a self-protective desire to avoid being 
stigmatized (Kelley, 1971). That he is a hairdresser, which is socially coded—for men—as a cue 
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of being gay, further supports this application of the discounting principle and amplifies 
observers’ identity suspicion. Notably, the formally correct application of the discounting 
principle suggests observers need not personally endorse hostile attitudes toward a marked 
identity to demonstrate identity suspicion. Rather, they merely need to be socially aware of 
prevalent norms that stigmatize the marked identity and incentivize its concealment. 
Examples of identity suspicion can be found in previous observational studies. For 
example, men frequently question each other’s claims of being straight in everyday contexts such 
as the schoolyard and the locker room (Anderson, 2009; Pascoe, 2005, 2007; Short, 2013). 
Although not necessarily so, these contexts are frequently characterized by men’s homophobia 
(Epstein, 1997; Pascoe, 2005; Taylor et al., 2011). The identity questioning that occurs in these 
settings can range in form from seemingly harmless teasing to violent confrontations. Another 
intriguing demonstration of identity suspicion within homophobic settings comes from analyses 
of Google traffic patterns that found searches posing the question, "Is my husband gay?" are 
much more frequent within U.S. states that have higher levels of anti-gay norms (Stevens-
Davidowitz, 2017). I suggest identity suspicion in both examples stems from recognizing that the 
stigmatizing social environment incentivizes anyone with the marked identity to conceal it, 
warranting the discounting of anyone’s claim to be straight.  
Alternatively, when social contexts do not stigmatize the marked identity—thus 
providing no incentive to conceal it—observers are not likely to question a person’s claim to the 
contrasting unmarked identity. For example, nonhomophobic social environments do not 
incentivize the concealment of non-straight identities. Although a man working as a hairdresser 
and explicitly claiming to be straight may still create some ambiguity around his “true” identity, 
contextualizing his behavior gives observers little reason to discount the man’s identity claim 
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because the nonhomophobic environment presents no incentive to falsely self-present as 
straight.3 In a community where all sexualities have equal social value, a wife would have no 
more reason to suspect her husband is secretly gay than a man would have to suspect his husband 
is secretly straight. Additionally, men would have no reason to question each other’s sexuality 
because there would be no reason for any of them to conceal a non-straight sexuality. Though 
such nonhomophobic environments may seem possible only in one’s imagination, a recent 
ethnographic study of boys in the 6th form (i.e., Grades 11 & 12) at several British secondary 
schools (McCormack, 2012) demonstrated that they do exist.  
Across five months and more than 500 hours of participant observation at one of these 
schools, McCormack (2011) reported witnessing no homophobia among the boys. Instead, these 
boys seemed to equally value diverse sexualities. In this nonhomophobic context, the students 
never seemed to question one another’s identity claims, in line with my theorizing. Students who 
claimed to be straight were taken at their word, even when they behaved in ways that are 
stereotypically coded as gay (in homophobic environments), such as demonstrative acts of 
affection towards same-sex peers. Given the accepting culture of this school, the students saw 
little reason to suspect that one of their straight-identifying classmates might secretly be gay, 
even though some of his behavior fit gay stereotypes. In their words, “[H]e’d tell us if he was 
[gay]… Yeah, why wouldn’t he” (McCormack, 2012, p. 79). 
Reading Behavioral Cues to Resolve Identity Suspicion 
 
3 I maintain that nonhomophobic social environments would not produce stereotypic associations of attributes (e.g., 
behaviors, interests, talents) with sexuality. For my purposes here, though, I retain my reference to this stereotypic 
association in reflection of the homophobic nature of current society, and to avoid the added cognitive burden of 
envisioning the implications of a related but distal outcome of a social context that already contrasts quite sharply 
with current society.   
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When people cannot trust one another’s identity claims because they are aware of 
pressures to conceal stigmatized identities, they may scrutinize each others’ behavior for cues 
that are conventionally considered to be indicators of the stigmatized identity. For example, the 
suspicion that individuals who claim to be straight might secretly be gay often relies on gendered 
cues—i.e., behaviors, interests, talents, etc., that are socially coded as masculine or feminine and 
thus befitting men or women, respectively—to discern whose claims to straight identity might be 
especially suspect. This reliance on gendered cues to infer possible same-sex sexuality reflects 
the traditional assumption that same-sex sexuality is rooted in gender inversion (Bem, 1993; 
Butler, 1990; Sedgwick, 1990). That is, feminine behaviors and interests expressed by men, or 
masculine behaviors and interests expressed by women, suggest the person may be gay or a 
lesbian, respectively (Ambady, Hallahan, & Conner, 1999; Butler, 1993; Connell, 1992; Parry & 
Johnson, 2007; Pascoe, 2005, 2007). In particular, the credibility of men’s claims to straight 
identity often hinges on their adherence to hegemonic masculine norms and their lack of 
behaviors and traits traditionally coded as feminine (e.g., Carnaghi, Maass, & Fasoli, 2011; Hunt, 
Fasoli, Carnaghi, & Cadinu, 2016; McGuffey & Rich, 1999; Plummer, 1999; Pollack, 1999; 
Vandello & Bosson, 2013). 
Secondary Closets 
Where identity suspicion exists, people are likely to be motivated to avoid becoming a 
target of suspicion by concealing those characteristics that define the identity as marked. 
Importantly, I suggest this pressure to conceal stereotypic characteristics of the marked identity 
will be felt not only by actual members of the marked group, but also by members of the 
unmarked group. For example, theory and research on precarious manhood (Vandello & Bosson, 
2013) indicates that men seek to downplay feminine attributes to demonstrate their masculinity 
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to themselves and others, because many laypeople assume a polar opposition of masculinity and 
femininity (Bem, 1993; Prentice & Miller, 2007). I propose that, within homophobic 
environments, men who identify as straight may be motivated to closet their feminine 
characteristics not only to project a credible image of masculinity, but also to avoid suspicion 
that they are secretly gay. Indeed, work on homophobia highlights how it serves to regulate 
straight men’s masculinity-related behavior (Whitley, 2001). Men who want to be seen as 
straight by others—in homophobic social environments—must conform to the particular gender 
norms of their environment (Anderson, 2008; McCreary, 1994). Thus, environments that 
pressure same-sex attracted individuals into the closet may, as a consequence, generate a 
secondary closet in which gay and straight men alike must conceal any characteristics 
stereotyped as gay.  
As is widely understood, identity de-stigmatization directly benefits members of a 
marked group by reducing their oppression and allowing them to openly express their identity 
without fear of harassment. I draw attention, however, to a less recognized way that identity de-
stigmatization benefits everyone, including those in the unmarked group. As Yep (2005) writes, 
“Most straight men are afraid to be sensitive, tender, and emotional because of the fear of being 
perceived or labeled ‘sissy’ or ‘faggot’…” (pp. 395-396). In response, my analysis suggests that 
de-stigmatizing concealable marked identities eliminates the incentive to conceal such identities. 
By eliminating this incentive, alternative explanations for discrepancies between behavioral cues 
and identity claims are also eliminated. As these alternative explanations invoke the discounting 
principle and are thereby the basis of identity suspicion, their elimination should also eliminate 
identity suspicion, freeing men up to express themselves as they want to, without concern of 
having their sexuality called into question.  
 
 12 
Accounting for Default Normativity Assumptions 
The hypothesis that identity-stigmatizing environments lead people to suspect that others 
secretly belong to the marked group might at first seem inconsistent with the well-known 
tendency of people to assume by default that others belong to the unmarked group, which is 
often in the numeric majority (Brekhus, 2003; Hegarty & Pratto, 2004; Zerubavel, 2018). As 
Brekhus (2003) notes, “Since an unmarked identity is the default assumption, absent any clear 
signifiers of a marked status, one often does not have to do anything to be perceived as a member 
of the unmarked category” (pp. 14-15). For example, many gay people routinely experience 
situations where others implicitly assume they are straight (e.g., asking girls and boys if they 
have a boyfriend or girlfriend, respectively; having a reference to one’s spouse be assumed to 
imply someone of the opposite sex). This default assumption that people are straight is known as 
heteronormativity. Although membership in the unmarked group is typically assumed by default, 
I hypothesize that this membership is vulnerable to suspicion when the stigma directed at the 
marked group is made salient. In other words, the default assumption that individuals belong to 
the unmarked group may be readily discarded when observers consider the stigmatization of the 
marked group and the concomitant incentives to conceal this identity. 
Current Studies 
Hypotheses 
A series of experiments test three primary hypotheses arising from my attributional 
model of identity suspicion:  
1. Environmental Context Hypothesis. When a person exhibits attributes commonly 
associated with a marked concealable identity but also asserts a contrasting unmarked 
concealable identity, perceivers will experience attributional ambiguity. To resolve this 
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ambiguity, perceivers will consider the climate of that person’s surrounding social 
environment to disambiguate their identity attributions. Specifically, when the person is 
situated in an environment that stigmatizes and oppresses—versus accepts and affirms—
the concealable marked identity, their identity claim will elicit more identity suspicion. 
Studies 1a to 4b tested this hypothesis by experimentally varying whether participants 
first read about a homophobic or nonhomophobic high school, and then (all) read about a young 
man in the school who exhibited (in most conditions) attributes stereotypically associated with 
gay men (i.e., marked concealable identity) but who said he was straight (i.e., contrasting 
unmarked concealable identity). Participants then estimated the likelihood that the young man is 
straight. To test the cross-stimulus generalizability of identity suspicion, his specific gender-
nonconforming attributes varied across studies, and were experimentally contrasted in Study 3 
against attributes stereotypically associated with straight men. Study 5 tested these hypotheses in 
a novel domain: religious identity in medieval Spain. Specifically, I experimentally varied 
whether participants read a description of the Spanish Inquisition or la convivencia, a time of 
relatively tolerant ‘coexistence’ among medieval Spanish Muslims, Christians, and Jews (Wolf, 
2009). Next, all participants read a description of a man who identified as Christian, but 
exhibited several attributes commonly associated with Judaism. Participants then estimated the 
likelihood that he was a Christian. This study provides preliminary tests of cross-domain 
generalizability of my key hypothesis. 
To assess the process by which social environments shape identity attribution, I tested 
two corollary hypotheses about whether identity-stigmatizing environments alter people’s 
perceptions of others’ identity-related concerns:  
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2. Attribute Concealment Hypothesis. A person who exhibits attributes commonly 
associated with a marked concealable identity, but who asserts a contrasting unmarked 
concealable identity, will be perceived as more motivated to hide those attributes when 
situated in an identity-stigmatizing (vs. identity-affirming) environment.  
3. Peer Suspicion Hypothesis. Similarly, the perceived likelihood of identity suspicion 
among the person’s peers—were they to find out about the stereotyped attributes—will 
increase when that person is situated in an identity-stigmatizing (vs. identity–affirming) 
environment. 
Studies 4a-5 tested these two corollary hypotheses by asking participants about their perceptions 
of the social environment’s implications for the high school student in Studies 4a & 4b and the 
Spanish man in Study 5, prior to my standard questions about identity suspicion.  
A Note on Definitions 
Here, I label a young man who says he is straight but exhibits attributes stereotypically 
associated with gay men as “gender-nonconforming,” despite these attributes being 
stereotypically associated with sexuality (i.e., being gay/not being straight) more so than gender 
per se (at least in the US). While a full discussion of the relationship between gender and 
sexuality is far beyond the scope of my work here, my choice to use “gender-nonconforming” 
was deliberate. Many masculinity theorists have argued that men’s gender and sexuality are so 
strictly policed that saying a man is masculine in effect says he is straight (e.g., Dean, 2014), 
hence the term heteromasculinity. I use “gender-nonconforming” with the understanding that, for 
men, failure to conform to the expectations of their gender often equates failure to conform to the 
expectation of being straight. For this reason, men with gender-nonconforming attributes are 
more likely to be seen as gay (Anderson & McCormack, 2016; McCormack & Anderson, 2014).  
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At the same time, I resist the idea that gender expression is reducible to markers of 
sexuality. Gender is, to a large extent, a social construction (e.g., Budgeon, 2014; Dean, 2014; 
Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 2013; Rahilly, 2018; Walker & Eller, 2016). Specific gender norms 
are inherently unstable and informed by history, geography, culture, race, social class, urbanity, 
and many other factors (e.g., Budgeon, 2014; Dunlap & Johnson, 2013; Hegarty & Pratto, 2004; 
McCormack & Anderson, 2014b; Pascoe & Diefendorf, 2019; D. Plummer, 2014; Smith, Parrott, 
Swartout, & Tharp, 2015). As such, the examples of gender nonconformity I have adopted in my 
research are bound to a specific sociohistoric and cultural moment; it is entirely possible they 
may not apply in the future. Rejecting, then, the idea that gender expression is an essential 
marker of sexuality, I have adopted the term “gender-nonconforming” in recognition of its social 
and academic usefulness in articulating my theory of identity suspicion. 
Sampling and Exclusions  
Because this work examines a novel effect, I followed recommendations (Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013) for effects of unknown magnitude and aimed for sample sizes of 
approximately n = 100/cell, plus 10% to account for necessary exclusions. Participants came 
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowdsourcing platform. MTurkers residing in the 
US were eligible to participate. Additionally, given the mixed reports on data quality on MTurk 
at the time I conducted these studies (2016-2017; e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; 
Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014), only MTurkers with a 
minimum HIT approval rate of 50% were eligible to participate. I chose this approval rate to 
avoid recruiting either only expert MTurkers or numerous careless responders. To ensure data 
quality, I also applied several a priori exclusion criteria. Analyses excluded participants who (a) 
withdrew their data after debriefing, (b) came from identical IP addresses within or across 
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studies, (c) provided more than one nonsense response on open-ended questions, or (d) failed all 
attention checks (see Table 1 for frequencies). 
Data Withdrawal. Due to my use of deception, participants were given the opportunity 
to withdraw consent for us to use their data after they had been fully debriefed on the study. 
Those who withdrew consent were excluded from analyses. 
Duplicate IP Addresses. I used TurkPrime.com to launch my studies. Each successive 
study excluded participants who had participated in a previous study so as to prevent repeat 
participants across studies. I also screened IP addresses within studies to ensure I did not have 
repeat participants within any one study. Where duplicate IP addresses were found (both within 
and across studies), usually the first record indicated the participant had not advanced beyond the 
consent form, so I retained their data from the complete record. In some cases, participants had 
seen the experimental material, but none of the dependent variables in the first record. In these 
cases, if participants were assigned to the same condition(s) on their full record, I retained their 
data because they were not aware of the differing conditions in my study. However, if 
participants were assigned to a different condition on their full record, I excluded them for 
having a duplicate IP address. In cases where participants saw and/or answered any of the 
dependent variables on their first record, I excluded their subsequent record(s) for having a 
duplicate IP address.  
Across studies, if a participant did not see the experimental material in their first and 
incomplete record on one study, I retained their data for the subsequent study they participated 
in. However, if they saw the experimental materials in the first study, I excluded them on any 
subsequent study for having a duplicate IP address. In this way I strove to maximize my use of 
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participants’ data while ensuring that I did not have repeat participants within any one study, or 
across all studies as a whole. 
Nonsense Responses. Each survey included multiple open-ended questions. A team of 
research assistants blind to my hypotheses coded these responses for nonsensical entries (e.g., 
blank entries; gibberish entries; entries unrelated to the question). Participants with more than 
one nonsense response were excluded. 
Attention Checks. Each survey ended with two or three attention check questions (see 
below). A team of research assistants coded these responses for accuracy. Participants who failed 




Chapter 2: Samples 1a – 1c 
Study 1a provides an initial test of my claim that the social environment in which a 
straight, gender-nonconforming young man is situated influences observers’ attributions 
regarding his sexuality. Specifically, I hypothesized that people reading about a straight-
identifying young man who exhibits attributes stereotypically associated with gay men will 
report more identity suspicion (i.e., question to a greater degree whether he is straight) when he 
is situated within a homophobic compared to nonhomophobic environment. In the current study, 
I primarily cued men’s gender-nonconformity by drawing on the stereotype that gay men love 
fashion (e.g., Madon, 1997; Massey, 2009, 2010; Morrison & Bearden, 2007). 
Method  
Participants and procedure. I aimed to recruit a final sample of 200 MTurk workers. 
Initially, 260 people started the study; 40 (15.4%) did not complete it.4 After 19 additional 
exclusions, the final sample comprised 201 participants (see Table 1 for demographics & 
exclusions). 
Participants signed up for a short online survey entitled “Social Perceptions.” The cover 
story described my study’s purpose as “examin[ing] impressions of environments and the people 
within them.” After providing consent, participants were randomly assigned to read one of two 
descriptions of a high school in England (Standard High) characterizing the social environment 
at the school as either homophobic or nonhomophobic. All participants then read the same 
profile of a gender-nonconforming, straight-identified male student (Steve) at Standard High, 
after which they completed questionnaires assessing their perceptions of Steve’s sexuality, 
Standard High, and their social network’s general attitudes toward sexual minorities. Finally, 
 
4 Attrition did not differ by condition, χ2(1) = 1.89, p = .169. 
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participants reported their demographics, read about the study’s true purpose (with the option to 
withdraw their data), received thanks, and were paid $0.75 USD for their participation.5 
Stimulus materials. I developed novel stimuli for this study. 
Social environment description. People read the following description of “Standard 
High”, presented as an excerpt from McCormack (2011a) ethnographic report of a British 6th 
form. Wording in brackets was included in the nonhomophobic versus homophobic conditions, 
respectively:  
The [absence/sheer prevalence] of homophobic behavior is the most striking finding at 
Standard High. Throughout the five months of data collection, including over 500 hours 
of participant observation, I [never heard/heard] the term “gay” used in derogatory ways 
[/almost daily]. Additionally, phrases such as “that’s so gay” are [not/frequently] used by 
these students. [Instead/In fact], the word “gay” is [only/rarely] used in its literal sense 
(i.e., when referring to homosexuality). Homophobic insults [have fallen out of usage 
altogether/are a normal part of daily discourse]. Tom provides more data supporting [an 
absence/the prevalence] of homophobia at Standard High. [An openly gay/A gay] student 
in the 12th Grade, he [insists/says] that he [does not hear/regularly hears] homophobic 
slurs and [does not feel/feels] subordinated by his peers. “I [like/don’t like] it here,” he 
says. “The other guys [are/aren’t] cool with it. … Nobody is [bothered/accepting].” 
Furthermore, [the boys/most of the boys] at Standard High stand firmly and 
publicly against [homophobia/homosexuality]. When the issue of 
[homophobia/homosexuality] is raised in private interviews, [all/nearly all] participants 
position themselves against it. They maintain this is true of their fellow students, too. For 
 
5 In this and all remaining studies, I included several additional measures that I do not discuss in my main text. For a 
full list of measures, please see Appendix A. 
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example, Matt, an athletic and popular boy, suggests that if someone was 
[homophobic/homosexual], he would be [policed/rejected] by his peers. Justin adds, 
“They wouldn’t get away with [homophobia/being gay]. We’d tell them it’s not ok.” 
Sam, a quieter student, agrees, “You might find [homophobia before the 11th Grade/gays 
tolerated at other schools], but not here. It’s just not [acceptable anymore/acceptable].” 
Thus, it seems that anyone at this school that is gay would have [no difficulty/difficulty] 
coming out. [Rather than homophobia being/Homophobia is] an integral part of the 
school climate at Standard High[,/;] boys here [stigmatize homophobic behaviors 
instead/heavily stigmatize homosexuality]. 
Notably, the nonhomophobic description comes almost verbatim from McCormack (2011a). I 
developed the homophobic description to mirror it as closely as possible in form and content to 
maximize internal validity. 
Profile. After the randomly assigned social environment description, everyone read the 
following profile: 
Steve is in the 12th grade at Standard High. He is a gifted musician, having studied piano 
since he was 5 years old. When auditions for the school's annual musical came round, he 
landed the leading role. I asked him about his hobbies and interests outside of school in 
his private interview and he answered, “I love fashion! In my spare time, I love to sketch 
my own designs. I haven’t shown them to anyone because I’m not sure they’re any good, 
but maybe someday.” When I laughingly joked that I have no fashion sense, Steve 
excitedly responded, “Oh my god! I should take you shopping! I could help you put 
together a whole new wardrobe, maybe get some new glasses to frame your face better, 
and definitely some new shoes,” as he looked down at my worn sneakers. Later in the 
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interview, when I asked Steve about his sexuality, he laughed and said, “Wouldn't you 
like to know.” He then added, “You might think I'm gay, but I'm straight. Just because I 
like fashion doesn't mean I'm gay, any more than a gay guy liking football makes him 
straight.” 
Several points related to this profile bear mentioning. First, the stereotype of gay men having an 
interest in fashion is pervasive and well-documented (Lippa, 2005; Madon, 1997; Massey, 2009, 
2010; Morrison & Bearden, 2007), with some arguing it originates with Oscar Wilde (e.g., 
Sinfield, 1994; but see also Thienpont, 2005). Accordingly, Steve’s love of fashion should prime 
participants to associate him with this stereotype and therefore suspect he may be gay. Second, 
Steve’s explicit claim to be straight should counteract any perception of Steve as gay—he is, 
after all, the ultimate authority on his sexuality. I expected, however, that in line with the 
discounting principle (Kelley, 1971) and Fein's (1996) work on suspicious mindsets, participants 
would be suspicious of Steve’s sexuality because his explicit claim contradicts the stereotypic 
association of men loving fashion with being gay.  
My decision to provide conflicting messages about Steve’s sexuality was deliberate. The 
attributional ambiguity created by such identity cue conflict allows us to examine whether 
participants look to the social environment for situational cues to disambiguate their impression 
of Steve’s sexuality, in line with attribution theory models (see Gilbert, 1998). Specifically, I 
wanted to know whether situating Steve in a homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) social 





Demographic Descriptives by Study 
Study 1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 3 4a 4b 5 Mega 
Total Initiated 260 262 403 512 344 500 567 636 393  



















Exclusions           
No Final Consent 2 3 7 4 3 5 10 6 1  
Nonsense Responses 0 1 0 3 3 4 1 1 4  
Failed Attention Checks 14 6 18 16 9 17 26 7 3  
Duplicate IP Address 3 3 6 7 2 4 0 5 0  
Incomplete main DV 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  
Final N 201 209 298 410 284 410 465 529 342 2467 
Age (Mdn) 38.5  38.7 35.0 37.0 37.0 36.0 35.0 37.0 33.5 36.0 
Sex (% Female) 57.7a 58.9 57.0 60.0 57.7 63.2 58.3a 67.1 52.3 61.2a 
Cisgender (%) N/A N/A N/A N/A 98.2 97.8 98.5 97.7 99.7 98.0b 
Exclusively Straight (%) 79.1c 75.6 79.9 78.8 76.1c 73.7c 75.3c 72.8c 79.2 76.0c 
Non-White (%) 17.9 21.1 17.1 18.8 18.7 21.2 21.4 17.8 29.8d 19.2 










































No HS Kids (%) 84.6e 87.1e 84.9e 85.9e 87.3e 86.8e 87.5 90.0e N/A 88.5e 
Note. Total initiated = everyone who clicked on the Mturk HIT to initiate the study; No Final Consent = withdrew consent/data after 
debriefing; Duplicate IP Address = duplicate IP address within or across studies; Cisgender = natal sex (i.e., sex assigned at birth) 
aligns with their gender identity; N/A = these demographics were not collected; HS = high school. 
aUnspecified sex: Study 1a (n = 2); Study 4a (n = 1); Mega-Analysis (n = 3). Intersex/Other: Study 4a & Mega-Analysis (n = 1). 
bUnspecified gender identity: Mega-Analysis (n = 879). This large number reflects the fact I did not measure gender identity in 
Studies 1a-2a. 
cUnspecified sexuality: Study 1a (n = 2); Study 2b (n = 2); Study 3 (n = 4); Study 4a (n = 6); Study 4b (n = 6); Mega-Analysis (n = 
18). 
dA revised race measure (see Methods) increased the proportion of non-Whites in my sample. 
eUnspecified number of children in high school: Study 1a (n = 4); Study 1b (n = 4); Study 1c (n = 7); Study 2a (n = 10); Study 2b (n = 
5); Study 3 (n = 6); Study 4b (n = 6); Mega-Analysis (n = 33). 
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Measures.  After reading the social environment description and profile, participants 
completed measures of my primary construct (identity suspicion) and potential confounds, 
moderators, and covariates. Here and in future studies, I present variables in analysis order and, 
for brevity’s sake, highlight only measures discussed in my results (for a full list of measures in 
viewing order by study, please see Appendix A). I reserve tests of potential confounds, 
moderators, and covariates—environment believability, actor likeability, relevant attitudes of 
one’s closest social network, demographics (including sexuality)—for Chapter 6, where I 
conduct mega-analyses to maximize analytical power and, therefore, confidence in the results. 
Primary hypothesis: Identity suspicion. My primary dependent variable was the 
perceived likelihood that Steve was straight, reverse-scored to index identity suspicion. To 
prevent potential reluctance to report suspicion of Steve’s claimed sexuality (based on socially 
desirable responding), Study 1a included the following preamble (removed in later studies): 
As you may know, adolescence is a time when identity begins to emerge. Teens may 
experiment with hairstyles, fashion, and various hobbies or interests as they try to work 
out their own identity. Sometimes, they will also present themselves as having a certain 
sexual orientation that is not their true orientation. 
Next, on a sliding scale from 0% (No chance at all) to 100% (Absolutely guaranteed), people 
indicated, “How likely do you think it is:” that (a) “Steve is straight”, (b) “Steve is bisexual”, and 
(c) “Steve is gay”. Sliders were set at a starting position of 50% (Maybe/Maybe not). I always 
tested the perceived likelihood of Steve being straight first, with subsequent presentation order 
for bisexual and gay randomized. In line with my main hypothesis, I report only analyses of the 




To create a more intuitive index of identity suspicion, I reverse-scored participants’ 
reports of the likelihood Steve is straight, such that higher scores indicate more intense suspicion. 
Thus, an originally estimated 15% likelihood of Steve being straight converts to 85% suspicion 
(i.e., 100% - 15%).  
Results and Discussion 
Data analysis strategy.  Prior to analyses, I tested relevant assumptions and effects-
coded social environments (−1 = nonhomophobic; +1 = homophobic). I tested my main 
dependent variable using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), which is quite robust to 
violations of normality in dependent variables (Howell, 2013). Because identity suspicion 
showed a non-normal distribution, however, I followed up the ANOVAs with non-parametric 
tests of median differences between social environments. Across all studies, non-parametric tests 
supported the results of parametric tests reported here (see Appendix B). Here and in future 
studies, bracketed values indicate 95% confidence intervals (CIs) unless otherwise indicated or, 
for η2 or ηp2 (which cannot be negative), where a 90% CI is equivalent to calculating a 95% CI 
for Cohen’s d (see Lakens, 2014; Steiger, 2004). These 90% CIs correspond to a standard F test 
with alpha set to .05, allowing us to claim 95% confidence that the population value is not below 
the lower bound (Smithson, 2001). (For 90% CIs, a lower bound of .00 indicates non-significant 
test results.)  
Primary analysis: Identity suspicion. As predicted, identity suspicion differed by social 
environment, F(1, 199) = 11.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .06 [.01, .11]. Specifically, people were more 
suspicious of Steve’s claim to be straight in the homophobic (M = 44.79, SD = 27.41) than 
nonhomophobic (M = 31.67, SD = 27.21) environment. Some raw percent likelihood estimates 
were not additively correct (summing to more or less than 100%), so I computed relative 
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estimates by dividing the perceived likelihood that Steve is straight by the sum of all likelihood 
judgments (i.e., straight, bisexual, gay). These relative likelihood estimates paralleled raw 
estimates closely, r(200) = .87, p < .001, and differed by environment: Participants reported 
more identity suspicion in the homophobic than nonhomophobic environment (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
Additively Corrected Likelihood Estimates of Identity Suspicion (Studies 1a-5). 
 
   Omnibus Results  NH vs. H  NH vs. CTRL 
     90% CI   95% CI   95% CI 
#S Cond M (SD) F ηp2 LL UL  d LL UL  d LL UL 
1a NH 48.90 (28.08) 5.05* .03 .002 .07         
 H 57.74 (27.62)             
1b NH 49.40 (28.03) 3.91* .02 .00003 .06         
 H 56.92 (26.97)             
1c NH 45.72 (26.85) 2.62† .02 .00 .05  0.27† –0.00 0.55  0.03 –0.25 0.30 
 H 53.07 (26.71)             
 CTRL 45.04 (26.88)             
2a NH 30.88 (27.00) 2.60† .01 .00 .03  0.28* 0.04 0.52  0.12 –0.12 0.35 
 H 38.41 (25.55)             
 MH 34.04 (28.68)             
2b NH 30.66 (23.57) 1.11 .01 .00 .03  0.22 –0.07 0.51  0.08 –0.20 0.36 
 H 36.23 (26.94)             
 MH 32.80 (25.85)             
3 NH 16.52 (18.91) 52.00*** .11 .07 .16         
 H 31.64 (24.17)             
 GC 20.59 (20.62) 11.36** .03 .01 .06         
 GNC 27.46 (24.61)             
 INT — 4.01* .01 .0001 .03         
4a NH 31.04 (23.32) 30.10*** .06 .03 .10         
 H 43.25 (24.69)             
4b NH 35.42 (24.56) 12.39*** .02 .01 .05         
 H 42.77 (23.49)             
56 RT 39.27 (22.72) 41.94*** .11 .06 .17         
 AJP 56.59 (26.58)             
Note. NH = nonhomophobic social environment; H = homophobic social environment; CTRL = 
control social environment; #S = Study number; Cond = condition; LL = lower limit; UL = upper 
limit; GC = gender-conforming profile; GNC = gender-nonconforming profile; INT = Social 
 
6 Correcting for a Levene’s violation, F(1, 340) = 4.74, p = .030, produced converging results, Welch’s F(1, 333.1) 
= 42.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .11 [.06, .17]. 
 
 27 
Environment × Men’s Gender Cue interaction; RT = Religious tolerance; AJP = Anti-Jewish 
persecution. 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Study 1b 
Study 1a provided initial support for my primary identity suspicion hypothesis. People 
reported more identity suspicion when Steve was in a homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) social 
environment. In Study 1b, I tested a boundary condition of the environmental effect on identity 
suspicion. Specifically, Anderson (2008) reported that 40% of the 68 straight-identifying male 
cheerleaders he interviewed reported having engaged in “limited forms of same-sex sex” (p. 
104). Importantly, none of them perceived their straightness to be contested by these same-sex 
sexual experiences. In Study 1b, I aimed to test environmentel effects on participants’ suspicion 
of a young man’s sexuality if he identified as straight and reported having previously engaged in 
same-sex sexual behavior. According to identity suspicion theory, participants should report less 
identity suspicion toward this young man’s claim to be straight when he is situated in a 
nonhomophobic (vs. homophobic) environment because it presents no incentive to conceal a 
non-straight sexuality, whereas the homophobic environment does.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. I aimed to recruit a final sample of 200 MTurk workers. 
Initially, 262 participants initiated the study; 39 (14.9%) did not complete it.7 After excluding an 
additional 14 participants, my final sample comprised 209 participants (see Table 1 for 
demographics and exclusions). 
The procedure mirrored Study 1a, using updated stimuli described below. 
 
7 Attrition rates did not differ by condition, χ2(1) = 0.30, p = .862. 
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Stimulus materials. Revised stimuli included a new profile featuring past same-sex 
sexual experience as Steve’s form of gender-nonconformity. 
Profile. After reading their randomly assigned environmental description, everyone read 
the following description of Steve’s profile: 
Steve is in the 12th grade at Standard High. He is generally well liked by his peers and is 
somewhat popular. He plays tennis on the school team and is a member of Student 
Council. When asked about homosexuality in his private interview, he said he has no 
issues with anyone being gay. Referring to Tom, a gay student at Standard High, he said, 
"He's a cool guy, a bit shy, but I enjoy spending time with him." When I responded by 
asking if he had ever done anything sexual with a guy, he answered, "Yeah, I’ve 
experimented before. I got drunk at a party once and made out with this guy. We fooled 
around a bit too." Still, he said, "I don't perceive myself as gay. I like women far too 
much for that." When asked if he identifies as bisexual, he replied, "No. I‘m straight; I'm 
just not a homophobe. Fooling around with a guy doesn't make me gay any more than a 
gay guy having sex with a woman makes him straight." 
My description of Steve’s past same-sex sexual experience defies the one-time rule of 
homosexuality for men (Anderson, 2008). That is, “one same-sex sexual experience is [all that it 
takes for a man to be] equated with a homosexual orientation in masculine peer culture” (p. 105). 
While limitations to this rule exist, such as same-sex sex in all-male prisons (Hensley, 
Tewksbury, & Wright, 2001; Saum, Surratt, Inciardi, & Bennett, 1995), and in limited 
circumstances wherein men engaging in same-sex sex simultaneously affirm their straightness 
(Ward, 2008), in North American culture, men are generally held to the one-time rule if they 
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hope to attain both straightness and masculinity (Anderson, 2005; Butler, 1990). As such, 
Steve’s profile cues a particularly strong association with being gay.  
Measures. Everyone completed the measure of identity suspicion from Study 1a (M = 
36.61, SD = 27.72). 
Results and Discussion 
Primary analyses: Identity suspicion. Unlike Study 1a, identity suspicion did not differ 
significantly by social environment, F(1, 207) = 2.47, p = .118, ηp2 = .01 [.00, .05]. Nonetheless, 
the pattern of means were in the hypothesized direction. Participants reported descriptively more 
identity suspicion when Steve was situated in the homophobic environment (M = 39.57, SD = 
28.09) compared to the nonhomophobic (M = 33.56, SD = 27.13) environment. As in Study 1a, I 
calculated the relative likelihood estimates to correct for non-additivity in raw estimates. As 
before, the relative estimates closely paralleled raw estimates, r(209) = .89, p < .001. Contrasting 
the result using raw estimates, participants reported significantly more identity suspicion in the 
homophobic than nonhomophobic condition.  
Though the raw estimates of identity suspicion did not differ significantly, the pattern of 
means were in the hypothesized direction. This is worth noting because the gender-
nonconforming cue in Steve’s profile represents a particularly strong marker of being gay. Given 
that society generally polices men’s sexual behavior very strictly (e.g., one-time rule of 
homosexuality; Anderson, 2008), it is relatively surprising that participants in the 
nonhomophobic environment reported a descriptively lower amount of identity suspicion than 
their counterparts in the homophobic environment. Nonetheless, I caution against 




Studies 1a and 1b provided initial support for my primary hypothesis. People reported 
more identity suspicion—statistically in Study 1a and descriptively in Study 1b—when Steve 
was in a homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) social environment. Without a baseline condition, 
however, I cannot identify which social environment drives this effect. Accordingly, in Study 1c 
I added a third environment that made no mention of sexuality and focused instead on a positive 
aspect of life at Standard High. By omitting mention of sexuality in the environmental 
description, participants have no contextual information to resolve the inconsistency of identity 
cues in Steve’s profile. Accordingly, I intended for identity suspicion ratings in this environment 
to serve as a baseline against which to compare identity suspicion ratings in the 
(non)homophobic environments.  
This study also used a different form of men’s gender-nonconformity: emotional 
expressivity regarding same-sex friendships. Past work on masculinity has demonstrated a strong 
norm for emotional stoicism among men (Levant, Hall, & Rankin, 2013; Way, 2013), especially 
within same-sex friendships (Way, 2013). As such, I hypothesized that in a homophobic (vs. 
nonhomophobic) social environment, people would be more suspicious of Steve’s sexuality 
because he spoke candidly about the emotional intimacy between himself and his same-sex best 
friend, Connor. By using a new cue of men’s gender-nonconformity, Study 1c also tests the 
generalizability of identity suspicion across cues of gender-nonconformity. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. I aimed to recruit a final sample of 300 MTurk workers. 
Initially, 403 participants initiated the study; 73 (18.1%) did not complete it.8 After excluding an 
 
8 Attrition rates differed marginally by condition, χ2(2) = 5.39, p = .067, with slightly less attrition in the 
nonhomophobic (11.9%) than homophobic (21.6%) and extra-curricular (20.9%) conditions. 
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additional 31 participants, along with one who skipped the main dependent measure, my final 
sample comprised 298 participants (see Table 1 for demographics & exclusions). 
The procedure mirrored Study 1a, using updated stimuli described below. 
Stimulus materials. Revised stimuli included a third social environment and same-sex 
emotional intimacy as the gender-nonconformity in Steve’s profile. 
Social environments. To create a baseline against which to compare the social 
environments from Study 1a, I included a third description of a social environment without 
information about homophobia. Specifically, people read the following: 
The sheer prevalence of extracurricular activity is the most striking finding at Standard 
High. Throughout the five months of data collection, including over 500 hours of 
participant observation, I constantly heard students chatting about which clubs and after-
school activities they were taking part in. Additionally, the staff at Standard High seem 
excited to be involved with the different extra-curricular activities. Instead of 
complaining about the demands on their time outside of school, the staff frequently 
commented about how their involvement in extracurriculars enriched their relationships 
with students. This view is reflected in how highly the students seem to regard their 
teachers. Tom provides more data supporting students' positive views of the teaching 
staff at Standard High. He insists that he does not hear of his peers talking negatively 
about the staff. “The teachers here are cool,” he says. “They're willing to supervise all 
our school clubs, which means we get to have more fun outside of the class. … Nobody 
complains.” 
At a recent divisional school board meeting, the boys at Standard High stood 
firmly and publicly against a proposed policy that would require teachers to supervise 
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extracurricular activities without pay. When the issue of the proposed policy was raised 
in private interviews, all participants positioned themselves against it. They maintained 
this is the view of their fellow students, too. For example, Matt, an athletic and popular 
boy, suggested that if the student sports council decided to organize a protest against the 
policy, all the students would be supportive and join in. Justin adds, “They [the 
division] wouldn’t get away with cutting funding. We’d tell them it’s not ok.” Sam, a 
quieter student, agrees, “You might find support for this policy in other places, but not 
here. It’s just not acceptable to any of us.” Thus, it seems that the students and teachers at 
this school regard each other with a great deal of respect. Rather than the apathy one 
might expect from male students at this age, the boys at Standard High are highly 
invested in supporting their teachers. 
As can be seen, the structure of this description closely mirrored that of the other two social 
environments to maximize internal validity. 
Profile. Next, everyone read the following description of Steve’s profile: 
Steve is in the 12th grade at Standard High. He has a small, tightly knit group of friends, 
plays tennis on the school team, and loves playing video games. In his private interview, I 
asked about his best friend, Connor. Steve answered, “Connor and I are really close, like 
emotionally. Whenever I see him, I’m instantly cheered up. And if there’s a day when 
he’s out from school I feel quite down, like I miss him, you know? We’re very 
comfortable with each other, and spend a lot of time together.” I asked how he and 
Connor had become such close friends and he replied, “Last year my parents divorced 
and it was kind of rough. I’d text and ask Connor if I could stay at his and we would bunk 
up in his bed and chat, sometimes for hours. I don’t know what I would’ve done without 
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him. There’s nobody I’m closer too, friend or family, and the same is true for him.” 
When asked if it felt odd sharing a bed with another guy, he replied, “No man, it’s just 
not a big deal,” and added, “Connor’s my closest friend. I love him, but we’re both 
straight; it’s not a sexual thing.” 
My description of Steve’s expressivity about the emotional intimacy between Connor and 
himself defies men’s gender norms around both emotional expressivity and same-sex emotional 
intimacy. Extensive research on masculinity norms has found that boys and men are traditionally 
expected to show emotional stoicism (e.g., Eisen & Yamashita, 2017; Jansz, 2000; Levant, Hall, 
& Rankin, 2013; Reigeluth & Addis, 2016; Thompson Jr. & Pleck, 1986). Male peers uphold this 
norm particularly strongly (Reigeluth & Addis, 2016), resulting in what some have called an 
“epidemic of loneliness” in older men (Greene, 2015; Reiner, 2016). Relative to women, men 
report wanting the same level of intimacy in their friendships (Way, 2013), but are less likely to 
achieve it due to masculine gender norms that stereotype emotional expressivity as characteristic 
of gay men (e.g., Massey, 2009; Morrison & Bearden, 2007). As such, Steve’s profile again cues 
readers to associate him with stereotypes of gay men.  
Measures. Everyone completed the measure of identity suspicion from Study 1a (M = 
32.57, SD = 24.43). 
Results and Discussion 
Primary analyses: Identity suspicion. Identity suspicion differed significantly across 
the three social environments, F(2, 295) = 4.13, p = .017, ηp2 = .03 [.003, .06]. Post-hoc 
analyses9 supported my primary hypothesis: Participants reported more identity suspicion when 
Steve was situated in the homophobic (M = 38.59, SD = 24.52) than nonhomophobic (M = 29.95, 
 
9 With only 3 levels and a significant omnibus test, no correction for familywise error is needed (Howell, 2013). 
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SD = 23.86) environment, p = .012, d = 0.36 [0.10, 0.63], replicating Study 1a. Identity suspicion 
in the extracurricular environment (M = 29.79, SD = 24.21) was lower than in the homophobic 
environment, p = .013, d = 0.36 [0.10, 0.65], and comparable to the nonhomophobic 
environment, p = .962.  
As in Study 1a, I calculated the relative likelihood estimates to correct for non-additivity 
in raw estimates. As before, the relative estimates closely paralleled raw estimates, r(297) = .89, 
p < .001, and differed by environment: Participants reported marginally more identity suspicion 
in the homophobic than nonhomophobic condition and significantly more than in the 
extracurricular environment (see Table 2). The extracurricular and nonhomophobic environments 
were comparable.  
These results suggest it is the presence of homophobia that introduces identity suspicion, 
rather than the absence of homophobia reducing an otherwise ever-present phenomenon of 
identity suspicion. That is, when participants were not given any contextual information to 
resolve the inconsistency of Steve’s identity cue conflict, their identity suspicion ratings were 
comparable to the nonhomophobic environment, where the lack of incentive to conceal being 
non-straight was made explicit. As such, these results suggest identity suspicion is not a default 
characteristic of gender-nonconformity. Rather, they are in line with Brekhus's (1996) notion of 
social markedness in that homophobic environments mark and stigmatize non-straight identities, 




Chapter 3: Samples 2a & 2b 
My first set of studies provides converging evidence for identity suspicion. When a 
young man who loved fashion, admitted to a same-sex sexual experience in his past, or openly 
described same-sex emotional intimacy also said he was straight, people looked to his 
surrounding social environment to disambiguate their perceptions of his sexuality. When he was 
situated in a homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) environment, they expressed more identity 
suspicion (i.e., questioned to a greater extent whether he was straight). These results are in 
keeping with the discounting principle. That is, homophobic environments create an incentive to 
conceal being gay. This incentive provides participants the opportunity to create a coherent 
impression of Steve by discounting his claim to be straight as an attempt to conceal being gay—
as his behaviors suggest he might be—due to the environmental homophobia surrounding him. 
In Study 2a, I sought to directly replicate the primary analyses in Study 1a and extend my tests of 
social environments to include an environment with mixed attitudes toward being gay.  
I tested two competing hypotheses across these three social environments. First, I 
hypothesized that if perceptions of Steve’s sexuality depend on the degree of homophobia in the 
environment, a linear trend would emerge across environments with the homophobic 
environment demonstrating the most identity suspicion, followed by the mixed-homophobia and 
then nonhomophobic environments (i.e., linear trend hypothesis). Alternately, I hypothesized 
that if homophobia in social environments functions as an all-or-nothing influence, I would see 
little to no difference in identity suspicion between the homophobic and mixed-homophobia 





Participants and procedure. I aimed to recruit a final sample of 400 MTurk workers. 
Initially, 512 participants initiated the study; 72 (14.1%) did not finish.10 After 30 additional 
exclusions, my final sample comprised 410 participants (see Table 1 for demographics & 
exclusions). 
I followed the procedure from Study 1a with one new environment description. 
Stimulus materials. This study retained the Study 1a profile of Steve that featured his 
love of fashion, and added a third (mixed homophobia) social environment.  
Social environments. In the new social environment, most, but not all, boys were 
nonhomophobic (mixed homophobia). Specifically, participants read the following: 
The mixture of homophobic discourse and support for gays is the most striking finding at 
Standard High. Throughout the five months of data collection, including over 500 hours 
of participant observation, I often heard the term “gay” used in derogatory ways. 
Additionally, phrases such as “that’s so gay” are frequently used by certain groups of 
students. At the same time, certain other groups of students only use the word “gay” in its 
literal sense (i.e., when referring to homosexuality). For them, homophobic insults have 
fallen out of usage altogether. Tom provides more data supporting the mixed attitudes at 
Standard High. An openly gay student in the sixth form, he says that although he 
regularly hears homophobic slurs from a few guys, he does not feel subordinated by most 
of his peers. “I don’t mind it here,” he says. “Sure, some guys aren’t cool with it … but in 
general, nobody is bothered.” 
 
10 Attrition rates did not differ by condition, χ2(2) = 1.78, p = .411. 
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In support of his statement, only some of the boys at Standard High stand firmly 
and publicly against homosexuality. In fact, when the issue of homosexuality11 is raised 
in interviews, most participants position themselves against it. They maintain that this is 
true of many of their fellow students too, though not all. For example, Matt, a sporty and 
popular boy, suggests that if someone was gay, he would be safe if he avoided the 
"homophobes". Justin adds, “He wouldn’t be beat up for being gay. We’d tell them [the 
"homophobes"] it’s not ok.” Sam, a quieter student, agrees, “You might find gays getting 
beaten up at other schools, but not here. It’s just not acceptable.” Thus, it seems that, 
while homophobia exists, it is not an integral part of the school climate at Standard High; 
most boys here do not condone homophobic behavior. 
As in Study 1c, the narrative structure of this environment mirrored that of the (non)homophobic 
environments to maximize internal validity. 
Measures. I refined my measure of identity suspicion (see below) and included two new 
measures: (a) participants’ certainty of their ratings of Steve’s sexuality, and (b) their 
endorsement of the dissociation of gender-nonconformity and sexuality. Fein and colleagues 
(1990) demonstrated that when observers became suspicious of an actor’s “true” motive, they 
also became less certain of their dispositional inferences. Accordingly, I tested whether 
participants in the homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) environment reported greater uncertainty 
due to the possibility that Steve might be self-presenting as straight to avoid stigmatization for 
being gay.  
 
11 Due to human error, this description erroneously included “homosexuality” here when it should have been 
“homophobia.” Given the mixed homophobia of the environment, together with the quotes that follow this sentence, 
it seems likely participants understood that not all boys at Standard High were homophobic. 
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I have theorized that identity suspicion emerges as a function of rational suspicion, as per 
the discounting principle, rather than individual bias. To test this claim, I compared participants’ 
endorsements of gender and sexuality’s dissociation across environments. If random assignment 
to environment was successful, ratings on this measure should not differ because participants 
with varying scores on this measure would have been relatively equally distributed across 
environments. As such, a null effect would support my theorizing that identity suspicion is an 
outcome of rational suspicion, not individual bias. 
Identity suspicion. In Studies 1a to 1c, I presented participants with a preamble that 
licensed them to express suspicion of Steve’s claim to be straight. From Study 2a onward, I 
dropped this preamble and simply instructed participants to “think about the profile of Steve that 
[they] just read.” Additionally, I combined the two items asking participants how likely they 
thought it was that Steve was bisexual or gay, because participants’ ratings in Studies 1a to 1c 
did not reliably differentiate between the two.12 From here on in, participants read, “How likely 
do you think it is that Steve is bisexual or gay?” As before, participants always rated the 
likelihood of Steve being straight—our key indicator of identity suspicion—first (M = 30.15, SD 
= 27.09). Results of the combined bisexual or gay item are available in Appendix C. 
Certainty of perceived sexuality. On a separate page, I reminded participants of their 
rating for the likelihood of Steve being straight. Specifically, they read: “You indicated that the 
likelihood that Steve is straight is 𝑥%” (“𝑥” = participant’s respective rating). I then asked, “How 
certain are you of the likelihood of Steve being straight” (hereafter called certainty). People 
 
12 Within-subjects tests comparing responses to the likelihoods Steve was bisexual or gay provided mixed 
results. In Sample 1a, the interaction between perceived sexuality and environment was significant, F(1, 199) = 
7.52, p = .007, η2 = .03 [.01, .09], but the differences between perceived sexualities did not vary as a function of the 
environment, F(1, 199) = 2.30, p = .131, η2 = .01 [.00, .05]. The interaction observed in Sample 1a was not 
significant in Sample 1b, F(2, 295) = 1.41, p = .247, η2 = .01 [.00, .03], or in Sample 1c, F(1, 207) = 3.84, p = .051, 
η2 = .02 [.00, .06]. Accordingly, we combined bisexual and gay into one category. 
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indicated their certainty from 0 (Not at all certain) to 4 (Absolutely certain) (M = 2.13, SD = 
1.22).  
Agreement with Steve. To assess beliefs about the association between men’s gender-
nonconformity and being gay, I asked participants to indicate the extent to which they 
(dis)agreed with Steve’s final statement: “Just because I like fashion doesn’t mean I’m gay, any 
more than a gay guy liking football makes him straight” (hereafter called agreement with Steve). 
People responded from –3 (Strongly disagree) to 3 (Strongly agree) (M = 2.12, SD = 1.28). 
Results and Discussion 
Primary analyses: Identity suspicion. Consistent with the linear trend hypothesis, a 
planned contrast revealed a significant linear pattern across the homophobic, mixed-homophobia, 
and nonhomophobic environments, F(1, 407) = 4.91, p = .027, ηLinear2 = .01 [.001, .04].13 Post-
hoc tests of identity suspicion were consistent with an incremental linear effect of increased 
homophobia on increased suspicion: the mixed-homophobia environment (M = 30.70, SD = 
28.24) fell descriptively between the nonhomophobic (M = 26.13, SD = 26.42) and homophobic 
environments (M = 33.45, SD = 26.19), and did not differ from either significantly: p = .162, d = 
0.17 [0.00, 0.40], and p = .396, d = 0.10 [0.00, 0.34], respectively. Replicating Studies 1a and 1c 
and the pattern of Study 1b, people were more suspicious of Steve’s sexuality when he was 
situated in the homophobic than nonhomophobic environment, p = .027, d = 0.27 [0.04, 0.51]. 
These results support my claim that increased pervasiveness of homophobia within social 
environments amplifies the strength of identity suspicion emerging within those environments.  
Secondary analyses. I submitted both certainty and agreement with Steve to exploratory 
ANOVA and linear trend models and followed-up with post-hoc analyses.  
 
13 Identity suspicion varied marginally across social environments, F(2, 407) = 2.50, p = .084, ηp2 = .01 [.00, .03]. 
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Certainty. Participants’ certainty of their ratings of Steve’s sexuality showed a significant 
linear trend, F(1, 407) = 5.06, p = .025, ηLinear2 = .01 [.001, .04]. In line with Fein and colleagues 
(1990), participants reported less certainty in the homophobic (M = 1.93, SD = 1.32) than 
nonhomophobic (M = 2.27, SD = 1.13) environment, p = .025, d = 0.27 [0.03, 0.51], while the 
mixed-homophobia environment (M = 2.19, SD = 1.18) fell descriptively between the two, 
differing marginally from the homophobic environment, p = .079, d = 0.21 [–0.03, 0.44], but not 
the nonhomophobic environment, p = .593.  
Agreement with Steve. Participants’ endorsement of the dissociation between gender 
cues and sexuality did not vary across environments, F(2, 407) < 1. Further, endorsement of this 
dissociation was strong across all environments. Although participants explicitly agreed—
regardless of environment—that gender cues do not signal specific sexualities, their attributions 
did not reflect these beliefs. These contrasting results suggest identity suspicion is not a function 
of homophobia or individual bias, but rather rational suspicion as per the discounting principle. I 
discuss this account in more detail later when I present mega-analytic tests of moderation. 
Study 2b 
In Study 2b, I sought to directly replicate the results from Study 1c. As in Study 2a, I 
included the mixed-homophobia social environment, testing the linear trend of identity suspicion 
(and observed differences in certainty) across environments. 
Method 
Participants and procedures. I aimed to recruit a final sample of 300 MTurk workers. 
Initially, 344 participants started the study; 43 (12.5%) did not finish.14 After 17 additional 
exclusions, my final sample comprised 284 people (see Table 1 for demographics & exclusions). 
 
14 Attrition rates differed significantly by condition, χ2(2) = 6.98, p = .031, with somewhat more attrition in the 
homophobic (19.1%) than the mixed-homophobia (9.6%) and nonhomophobic (8.8%) conditions. 
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I followed the same procedures as in Study 2a, with the stimuli noted below. 
Stimulus Materials. This study used the three social environments from Study 2a and 
the profile of Steve from Study 1c, in which he describes the emotional intimacy he shares with 
his same-sex best friend, Connor. Accordingly, I had to change my measure of participants’ 
agreement with Steve. Here, the interviewer asked Steve if it felt odd sharing a bed with another 
young man, to which Steve replied, “No man, it’s just not a big deal.” As before, participants 
indicated their level of (dis)agreement with Steve’s response from –3 (Strongly disagree) to 3 
(Strongly agree). For consistency, I retained the label from Study 2a (i.e., agreement with Steve). 
Measures. Participants completed measures of identity suspicion (M = 28.35, SD = 
25.45), certainty (M = 2.02, SD = 1.16), and agreement with Steve (M = 1.17, SD = 1.76).  
Results and Discussion 
Primary analyses: Identity suspicion. As hypothesized and replicating Study 2a, a 
planned contrast revealed a significant linear trend across all 3 conditions, F(1, 281) = 4.39, p = 
.037, ηlinear2 = .02 [.001, .05]. As in Study 2a, post hoc analyses showed that the nonhomophobic 
(M = 24.57, SD = 23.53) and homophobic (M = 32.40, SD = 27.03) environments differed 
significantly, p = .037, d = 0.31 [0.02, 0.60], and that the mixed-homophobia environment (M = 
28.48, SD = 25.67) fell descriptively between them but did not differ from either, both ps > .280. 
Together with Study 2a, these results lend support to my theorized positive association between 
the pervasiveness of homophobia within social environments and the strength of identity 
suspicion emerging within those environments. 
Secondary analyses. As with Study 2a, I submitted both certainty and agreement with 
Steve to ANOVA models and followed-up with post-hoc analyses.  
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Certainty. In contrast to Study 2a, neither the main effect of social environment on 
certainty, F(2, 281) = 1.08, p = .342, ηp2 = .01 [.00, .03], nor any post-hoc comparisons were 
significant, all ps > .193. Descriptively, participants were less certain of their identity suspicion 
ratings in the homophobic (M = 1.95, SD = 1.23) than nonhomophobic (M = 2.16, SD = 1.06) 
environment, replicating Study 2a, but the mixed-homophobia environment (M = 1.95, SD = 
1.19) matched the homophobic environment. Thus, additional studies are needed to determine 
the replicability, and general size, of any environment-driven differences in certainty ratings. 
Agreement with Steve. Agreement with Steve’s statement about it “not [being] a big 
deal” to share a bed with his best friend Connor did not vary by environment, as hypothesized: F 
(2, 281) < 1. Once again, the lack of environmental effects for agreement with Steve contradicted 
participants’ identity suspicion ratings, providing additional support for the latter emerging as a 




Chapter 4: Sample 3 
My first five studies have provided converging evidence that a homophobic (vs. 
nonhomophobic) social environment increases people’s suspicion about a gender-nonconforming 
young man’s assertion of his straight sexuality. Further, I have replicated this effect across two 
distinct forms of men’s gender-nonconformity, as attribution theory predicts I should. 
Nonetheless, the median identity suspicion estimates in the nonhomophobic environment never 
dropped below 17% across my four samples (Mdn range: 17%-29%)15. In Study 3, I addressed 
the question of why people remain somewhat suspicious of Steve’s sexuality in the 
nonhomophobic environment despite his lack of an immediate incentive to falsely present as 
straight. I did so by contrasting Steve’s gender-nonconforming profile with a gender-conforming 
profile and testing competing hypotheses. I reasoned that if identity suspicion in the 
nonhomophobic environment arises primarily from how strongly U.S. society stereotypes men’s 
gender-nonconformity as a marker of being gay—despite both Steve’s explicit claim to be 
straight and the pro-LGB environmental context—then a gender-conforming profile should 
produce dramatically less identity suspicion (stereotype persistence hypothesis). Alternately, if 
identity suspicion in the nonhomophobic environment arises not from gender-nonconformity but 
some other source instead (e.g., lay theories about the prevalence of specific sexual identities), I 
should expect to see similar levels of identity suspicion across the gender-conforming and -
nonconforming profiles in the nonhomophobic environment (equivalence hypothesis). 
In line with my reasoning, I tested the following hypotheses: identity suspicion will (a) 
increase when Steve has gender-nonconforming (vs. -conforming) interests; (b) increase in 
 
15 I refer here to medians instead of means because the former are less susceptible to extreme scores in the tails of 




homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) environments (i.e., environmental context hypothesis 
demonstrated in Studies 1a, 1c-2b); and (c) vary interactively as a function of gender-
(non)conformity and the social environment. Specifically, people will report more identity 
suspicion when Steve has gender-noncomforming interests in the homophobic environment 
relative to (d) having gender-conforming interests in this environment and (e) having gender-
nonconforming interests in the nonhomophobic environment. I remained agnostic about the 
simple effect of social environment for the gender-conforming profile, so I treat this test as 
exploratory. 
Method 
Participants and procedures. I aimed to recruit a final sample of 400 MTurk workers. 
Initially, 500 participants started the study; 58 (11.6%) did not finish it.16 After 30 additional 
exclusions, my final sample comprised 410 participants (see Table 1 for demographics & 
exclusions). 
I followed the same procedure as in prior studies, with the stimuli noted below. 
Stimulus materials. This study dropped the mixed-homophobia social environment, 
added a gender-conforming profile, and made minor revisions to the gender-nonconforming 
profile.  
Profiles. To increase internal validity between profiles, I made the following changes to 
the gender-nonconforming profile: (a) I dropped the expression, “Oh my god!” from the 
following excerpt, “Steve excitedly responded, “Oh my god! I should take you shopping!”; (b) I 
changed the introduction to asking about Steve’s sexuality to increase the plausibility of the 
interviewer asking this question in the gender-conforming profile (i.e., instead of, “when I asked 
 
16 Attrition did not differ by social environment, χ2(1) = 0.27, p = .605, by gender cue, χ2(1) = 0.34, p = .560, or 
across the four cells produced by their interaction, χ2(3) = 0.61, p = .895. 
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Steve about his sexuality,” participants read, “when I got to the part where I asked students about 
their sexuality”); (c) I dropped the flirtatious, “Wouldn't you like to know," in response to the 
interviewer’s question about Steve’s sexuality; and (d) I changed the following excerpt, “He then 
added, ‘You might think I'm gay, but I'm straight’,” to simply, “I’m straight.” These changes 
allowed me to maintain the gender-nonconformity of Steve’s interests while also maximizing 
internal validity via greater consistency across conditions. It is worth noting, however, that these 
changes also decreased the extent of gender-nonconformity in the profile featuring Steve’s love 
of fashion. I return to this point in the results. 
 Participants were randomly assigned a profile. Those in the gender-conforming condition 
read the following profile: 
Steve is in the 12th grade at Standard High. He is a gifted musician, having played the 
drums since he was 5 years old. When student council elections came round, he was 
elected sports council representative. I asked him about his hobbies and interests outside 
of school in his private interview and he answered, "I love rugby! In my spare time I love 
to watch my favorite team play. I haven’t tried out for a team yet because I’m not sure 
I’m any good, but maybe someday.” When I laughingly joked that I knew nothing about 
rugby, Steve excitedly responded, “I should take you to a match! I could explain the 
game to you and teach you everything there is to know about rugby. Who knows, you 
might even want to start playing!” He chuckled at the look of disbelief on my face. Later 
in the interview, when I got to the part where I asked students about their sexuality, Steve 
laughed and said, "I'm straight." 
I chose rugby as Steve’s interest in the gender-conforming profile because it is a very physical 
and sometimes violent sport (Nauright & Chandler, 1996), and because both sports and physical 
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aggression are closely aligned with masculinity (e.g., Anderson & McGuire, 2010; Berke, Reidy, 
Miller, & Zeichner, 2017; Levant et al., 2013; Smith, Parrott, Swartout, & Tharp, 2015). 
Measures. Everyone completed measures of identity suspicion (M = 24.04, SD = 22.94) 
and certainty (M = 2.20, SD = 1.20). I dropped agreement with Steve because I did not include a 
comparable statement in the gender-conforming profile.  
Results and Discussion 
Primary analyses: Identity suspicion. I conducted a 2 (Social Environment: 
Nonhomophobic vs. Homophobic) × 2 (Men’s Gender Cue: Conforming vs. Nonconforming) 
factorial ANOVA to test my hypotheses.17 Overall, participants expressed more identity 
suspicion of Steve’s sexuality when they read the gender-nonconforming (M = 27.46, SD = 
24.61) compared to gender-conforming (M = 20.59, SD = 20.62) profile, F(1, 406) = 11.36, p = 
.001, ηp2 = .03 [.01, .06], and when he was situated in the homophobic (M = 31.64, SD = 24.17) 
compared to nonhomophobic (M = 16.52, SD = 18.91) social environment, F(1, 406) = 52.00, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .11 [.07, .16]. These main effects were qualified by the predicted two-way 
interaction, F(1, 406) = 4.01, p = .046, ηp2 = .01 [.0001, .03] (see Figure 1). As hypothesized, 
tests of simple effects confirmed that when participants read the gender-nonconforming profile in 
the homophobic environment (M = 37.36, SD = 25.82), they reported more identity suspicion 
than: (a) those who read the gender-conforming profile in the same environment (M = 26.03, SD 
= 21.09), F(1, 202) = 11.80, p = .001, d = 0.48 [0.20, 0.76]; and (b) those who read the gender-
nonconforming profile in the nonhomophobic environment (M = 17.93, SD = 19.14), F(1, 204) = 
37.82, p < .001, d = 0.86 [0.57, 1.14]. The null effect of men’s gender cue on identity suspicion 
 
17 The data violated the assumption of homogeneity of variance, F(3, 406) = 10.95, p < .001, so I conducted simple 
effects analyses using restricted (rather than pooled) error terms. Because only mild heterogeneity of variance 
emerged, with the largest s2 less than 2 times greater than the smallest s2 (well below the recommended threshold of 
4; (Howell, 2013), no further corrections were applied. 
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in the nonhomophobic environment is consistent with the equivalence—not persistent 
association—hypothesis. That is, participants who read about a nonhomophobic environment 
were comparably likely to believe Steve’s claim to be straight, regardless of whether he liked 
fashion or rugby (M = 15.05, SD = 18.65), F(1, 204) = 1.20, p = .275, d = 0.15 [–0.12, 0.43].  
The exploratory simple effect of social environment for the gender-conforming profile 
mirrored—though less strongly—the difference observed for the gender-nonconforming profile. 
Even when Steve described liking rugby, a hypermasculine sport, people were still more 
suspicious of his claim to be straight when he was situated in the homophobic (vs. 
nonhomophobic) environment, F(1, 202) = 15.50, p < .001, d = 0.55 [0.27, 0.83].18 Despite the 
interesting implications of this result, I reiterate its exploratory nature and urge caution in its 
interpretation. 
 
18 Correcting for non-additivity of identity suspicion did not change the results. The main effect of environment and 
gender cue were significant, both ps < .001, as was their interaction, p = .046. The homophobic (vs. 
nonhomophobic) environment produced more identity suspicion for both gender cues, both ps ≤ .001. The gender-
nonconforming cue produced more identity suspicion than the gender-conforming one in the homophobic 




Figure 1. Social environment and gender cue interactively predict identity suspicion in Study 3. 
(Error bars indicate restricted SE.) 
Summary. While at first it may seem counterintuitive that belief in a stereotypically 
masculine young man’s claim to be straight would vary as a function of the homophobia in his 
social environment, this outcome aligns with my theorizing of identity suspicion—as informed 
by the discounting principle—and Anderson's (2009) homohysteria (i.e., the “[conceptualization 
of] the contexts when homophobia effects (sic) (or is used to police) heterosexual men’s 
gendered behaviors;” McCormack & Anderson, 2014a, p. 153). Environments that oppress a 
marked concealable identity incentivize people with that identity to closet it. In such 
environments, explicit claims to the contrasting unmarked concealable identity are subject to 
identity suspicion, because these claims may be self-protective. It is already known that 
homophobic environments are oppressive toward sexual minorities. What my data add to this 
understanding is that homophobic environments also negatively affect the sexual majority (in my 





































I note that identity suspicion for the gender-nonconforming profile in the nonhomophobic 
environment was substantially lower in this study (M = 16.52) than in Studies 1a and 2a (24.57 < 
M < 31.67). Though I cannot speak empirically to the cause of this specific decrease in identity 
suspicion, I highlight my removal of several elements of gender-nonconformity from the profile 
and speculate that this removal may have decreased the amount of identity suspicion aroused in 
the nonhomophobic environment.  
Secondary analysis: Certainty. A factorial ANOVA tested participants’ certainty in 
their estimates of Steve’s sexuality across conditions. The data again violated the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance, F(3, 406) = 3.77, p = .011, so I conducted simple effects analyses 
using restricted error terms.19 
Participants were less certain of their ratings in the homophobic (M = 1.88, SD = 1.23) 
than the nonhomophobic (M = 2.51, SD = 1.09) environment, F(1, 406) = 30.74, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.07 [.04, .11], in line with Study 2a and Fein and colleagues (1990). Descriptively, participants 
were also less certain of their ratings for the gender-nonconforming (M = 2.12, SD = 1.28) than 
the gender-conforming (M = 2.28, SD = 1.11) profile, but this difference was not significant, F(1, 
406) = 2.17, p = .142, ηp2 = .01 [.00, .02]. The two-way interaction was marginally significant, 
F(1, 406) = 3.27, p = .071, ηp2 = .01 [.00, .03]. On an exploratory basis, tests of simple effects 
found that participants reported less certainty in their ratings of Steve’s sexuality when they read 
the gender-nonconforming (M = 1.69, SD = 1.30) than the gender-conforming (M = 2.07, SD = 
1.13) profile in the homophobic environment, F(1, 202) = 4.83, p = .029, ηp2 = .02 [.001, .07].20 
Replicating Study 2a, participants who read the gender-nonconforming profile expressed less 
 
19 Because only mild heterogeneity of variance emerged, with the largest s2 less than 1.6 times greater than the 
smallest s2 (well below the recommended threshold of 4; (Howell, 2013), no further corrections were applied. 
20 Correcting for a Levene’s violation, F(1, 202) = 7.09, p = .008, driven by more variance in the gender-
nonconforming condition, produced converging results, Welch’s F(1, 197.0) = 4.81, p = .029, ηp2 = .02 [.001, .07]. 
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certainty about their ratings in the homophobic than nonhomophobic environment (M = 2.53, SD 
= 1.13), F(1, 204) = 24.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .11 [.05, .18].21 Mirroring the results for the gender-
nonconforming profile, participants who read the gender-conforming profile also expressed less 
certainty about their ratings in the homophobic than nonhomophobic (M = 2.50, SD = 1.06) 
environment, albeit to a lesser degree, F(1, 202) = 7.77, p = .006, ηp2 = .04 [.01, .09]. Similar to 
my results for identity suspicion, certainty ratings did not differ by gender cue in the 
nonhomophobic environment, F(1, 204) < 1. 
Summary. It is noteworthy that the results for certainty so closely mirrored those of 
identity suspicion. I examined their (negative) correlation across all four cells and found they 
were strongly associated, |.60| < rs(101-105) < |.70|, suggesting that suspicion and uncertainty 
occur in tandem, as hypothesized and demonstrated by Fein and colleagues (1990). 
  
 
21 Correcting for a Levene’s violation, F(1, 204) = 5.01, p = .026, produced converging results, Welch’s F(1, 197.5) 
= 24.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .11 [.05, .18]. 
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Chapter 5: Samples 4a & 4b 
In Study 3, I replicated the effect of social environment on identity suspicion and 
provided initial evidence that this effect is attenuated but not eliminated for a gender-conforming 
young man who says he is straight. Despite Steve’s gender-conforming interest in the 
hypermasculine sport of rugby, participants still expressed more suspicion of his sexuality in the 
homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) environment. Of equal interest, the nonhomophobic 
environment enabled comparable trust in Steve’s claim to be straight, regardless of whether he 
was interested in fashion or rugby. Studies 4a and 4b therefore return to focusing on a gender-
nonconforming individual. 
Having demonstrated converging evidence of the effect of social environments on 
identity suspicion in six separate samples, I shifted my focus in the next set of studies to testing 
my theorized mechanism of identity suspicion. That is, I theorized identity suspicion emerges as 
a function of people’s recognition of the incentive to closet certain marked concealable identities. 
In this study, I formally test this proposition by examining whether people recognize how social 
environments affect perceptions of a straight-identifying, gender-nonconforming man’s 
sexuality. Specifically, I hypothesized that in the homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) social 
environment: participants would perceive (a) a greater likelihood of identity suspicion among 
Steve’s peers (hereafter called peer identity suspicion) and (b) greater motivation for Steve to 
conceal his gender-nonconformity from his peers (hereafter called motivation to conceal). 
Additionally, I hypothesized a mediation model in which peer identity suspicion mediated the 
impact of social environments on motivation to conceal. Most importantly, I tested mytheory’s 
claim that recognition of an incentivized closet in identity-oppressive environments gives rise to 
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identity suspicion. Specifically, Ihypothesized a mediation model in which motivation to conceal 
mediated the effect of environment on participants’ identity suspicion. 
This study also tested whether stigmatizing social environments carry downstream costs 
for gender-nonconforming individuals. Here, I assessed whether the environment effect would 
extend to people’s perceived likelihood of Steve pursuing a gender-nonconforming opportunity 
(hereafter called downstream costs). Specifically, I hypothesized that people who read about the 
homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) environment would perceive Steve as less likely to pursue the 
opportunity to win a scholarship in a gender-nonconforming domain.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. I aimed for a final sample of 500 MTurk workers to attain 
sufficient power to test a mediation model. Of the 564 people who started the study, 65 (11.5%) 
did not complete it.22 After 34 additional exclusions, my final sample comprised 465 participants 
(see Table 1 for demographics & exclusions).  
The procedure matched Study 2a, with the removal of the mixed-homophobia 
environment and the addition of several new measures immediately following Steve’s profile and 
preceding all other dependent measures.  
Measures. Everyone completed measures of identity suspicion (M = 32.45, SD = 25.21) 
and certainty (M = 1.96, SD = 1.26). Additionally, participants completed three new measures: 
peer identity suspicion, motivation to conceal, and downstream costs.  
Peer identity suspicion. Participants rated the likelihood of identity suspicion among 
Steve’s peers (i.e., “If other students at Steve's school learned about his interest in fashion, how 
 
22 Attrition varied marginally by condition, χ2(1) = 2.99, p = .084. Closer examination revealed a marginally higher 
rate of attrition in the homophobic (13.8%) than nonhomophobic (9.2%) environment. 
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likely do you think it is that they would question that he is straight?”) from 0 (Not at all likely) to 
4 (Extremely likely; M = 2.56, SD = 1.34). 
Motivation to conceal. Next, participants indicated how motivated Steve was to conceal 
his gender-nonconformity from his peers (i.e., “How much do you think Steve is motivated to 
conceal his interest in fashion from his peers?”) from 0 (Not at all motivated) to 4 (Extremely 
motivated; M = 1.96, SD = 1.26). 
Downstream costs. To test perceptions of the costs the environment would hold for 
Steve, I provided a description of Steve’s art teacher encouraging him to enter an annual 
citywide art competition in which the top three entries would win a £500 scholarship. 
Specifically, participants read the following description: 
Steve is enrolled in an art class at Standard High. One of the class’s first major 
assignments is to create an art piece that is inspired by a popular television show set 
several centuries in the past. Steve chooses to design a costume for his favorite character 
on the show, one of the female leads. When everyone receives their grade for the 
assignment several weeks later, Steve gets a note instead, asking him to see the teacher 
after class. 
After the other students have left, he approaches his teacher and she looks up at 
him from her desk and smiles. “Hi Steve. Thanks for coming to see me. I wanted to talk 
to you about your costume design. I was so impressed by it! I think it’s some of the best 
work I have ever seen by a student.” Steve looks down and smiles, blushing slightly. 
“As you know, the annual art competition in London is coming up. I think you 
should submit this drawing. The best three pieces receive a £500 scholarship, and I think 
you would stand a good chance of placing in the top 3. If you’re interested, you’d first 
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have to participate in the school-level competition here. We put up all the submissions in 
the main hall – including yours – with the artist’s name beneath it. We display them for a 
week so that all the staff, teachers and students have a chance to see it. At the end of that 
week, everyone votes on the piece they think deserves to win, and the winner goes on to 
the citywide competition.” The warning bell for the start of the next class rings, and she 
quickly adds, “Think about it and let me know by Friday what you decide.” Steve nods 
and leaves for his next class. 
After reading the description of the hypothetical scenario, participants rated on a 6-point 
scale from Extremely unlikely (here, scored 2.5) to Extremely likely (scored −2.5) their estimated 
likelihood that Steve would submit his costume design to the school-wide art competition (M = 
−1.07, SD = 1.32). Because estimates of lower likelihoods reflect higher perceived costs, I 
scored this measure such that higher scores indicate a greater perceived downstream cost to 
Steve. 
Results and Discussion 
Primary analyses. As hypothesized, participants anticipated a higher likelihood of peer 
identity suspicion in the homophobic (M = 3.39, SD = 0.90) than nonhomophobic (M = 1.77, SD 
= 1.21) environment, F(1, 463) = 263.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .36 [.31, .41].23 They also believed 
Steve would be far more motivated to conceal his gender-nonconforming interest from his peers 
when he was situated in the homophobic (M = 2.84, SD = 1.17) than nonhomophobic (M = 1.11, 
SD = 1.23) environment, F(1, 463) = 242.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .34 [.29, .39]. Similarly, participants 
also perceived more downstream costs for Steve when he was located in the homophobic (M = 
−0.48, SD = 1.37) than nonhomophobic (M = −1.63, SD = 0.98) environment, F(1, 463) = 
 
23 Correcting for a Levene’s violation, F(1, 463) = 42.77, p < .001, produced converging results, Welch’s F(1, 
439.9) = 268.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .38 [.32, .43]. 
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110.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .19 [.14, .24].24 In other words, participants thought Steve would be 
substantially less likely to enter the art competition in the homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) 
environment (though participants still believed it was at least “slightly likely” Steve would enter 
the competition), presumably because doing so would involve showcasing his gender-
nonconformity (and thereby increase the risk he might be perceived as gay). Finally, replicating 
previous studies, participants rated their own identity suspicion higher in the homophobic (M = 
38.41, SD = 26.37) than nonhomophobic (M = 26.82, SD = 22.73) environment, F(1, 463) = 
25.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .05 [.02, .09].25 
These results provide initial evidence that people expect homophobic environments 
create secondary closets by driving straight-identifying men to conceal their gender 
nonconformity for fear of not being perceived as straight. Here, participants perceived 
sufficiently strong negative effects of a homophobic environment to make a straight-identified 
young man only “slightly likely” (vs. “moderately likely” in the nonhomophobic environment) to 
pursue an opportunity to showcase his talent and win a scholarship, presumably because doing so 
would involve showcasing his gender nonconformity (and thereby increase the risk he might be 
perceived as gay).  
 
 
24 Correcting for a Levene’s violation, F(1, 463) = 25.72, p < .001, produced converging results, Welch’s F(1, 
405.0) = 108.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .21 [.16, .27]. 
25 Correcting for a Levene’s violation, F(1, 463) = 5.70, p = .017, produced converging results, Welch’s F(1, 444.7) 




Figure 2. Mediation model with motivation to conceal mediating the effect of social environment 
(–1 = nonhomophobic; +1 = homophobic) on identity suspicion in Studies 4a-5. I report 
unstandardized coefficients for the paths and bootstrapped 95% CIs for the indirect paths. 
**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Mediation analyses. In line with my theorizing, motivation to conceal significantly 
mediated the effect of social environment on participants’ identity suspicion, as indicated by a 
95% CI for the indirect effect excluding zero (see  
Figure 2). These results provide initial evidence that people intuitively recognize that 
homophobic environments create secondary closets in which straight-identifying men are driven 
to closet their gender-nonconformity for fear of not being perceived as straight. I examine this 
conclusion in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
As hypothesized, peer identity suspicion significantly mediated the effect of social environment 
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Figure 4.). An alternate model swapping motivation to conceal with peer identity suspicion was 
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Figure 4.), suggesting both models are empirically plausible. Accordingly, I refrain from 
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Variables  1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 3 4a 4b 5 
Age .05 .03 –.07 .06 –.06 .07 –.02 –.03 .11† 
Participant Sex .10 .04 .03 .06 .20*** .01 .10* .05 .02 
Education .00 –.03 .04 –.03 .00 .05 .00 .03 .02 
Income –.03 –.09 .09 .00 .03 .07 .07 –.01 –.06 
Racea –.01 .07 –.03 –.06 –.07 –.04 –.08 .07 –.12* 
Religionb — — — — — — — — .09† 
Importance of Religion — — — — — — — — –.12* 
Favorable Impressions  –.12† –.40*** –.34*** –.27*** –.25*** –.15** –.09† –.33*** –.25*** 
Importance of Own Gender Identity .04 .12 –.02 .02 –.05 –.04 –.10* — — 
Importance of Own Sexuality .01 .17* –.02 –.03 –.09 –.06 –.10* — — 
Friends' LGB Allyship –.06 –.16* .03 –.13* –.03 –.01 –.10* –.08† — 
Friends’ Pro-LGB Attitudes –.12† –.19** –.11† –.05 –.05 .05 –.05 –.04 — 
Number of LGB Friends .00 –.14* .03 — — — — — — 
Believability –.14* –.09 –.18** –.23*** –.07 .02 .03 –.16*** — 
Own High School Similarity .04 –.01 –.12* –.03 .05 .22*** .09† .06 — 
U.S. High Schools’ Similarity .05 .01 –.05 –.03 –.01 .10 .13** –.03 — 
Certainty — — — –.58*** –.69*** –.69*** –.57*** –.57*** –.40*** 
Agreement with Steve — — — –.56*** –.55*** — — –.49*** — 
Peer Identity Suspicion — — — — — — .22*** .33*** .37*** 
Motivation to Conceal — — — — — — .23*** .28*** .38*** 
Friends’ Attitudes Toward Christians — — — — — — — — –.21*** 
Friends’ Attitudes Toward Jews — — — — — — — — –.12* 
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Knowledge of Medieval Spain — — — — — — — — –.01 
Knowledge of Spanish Inquisition — — — — — — — — –.05 
Knowledge of La Convivencia — — — — — — — — –.04 
Knowledge of Christian Culture — — — — — — — — –.07 
Knowledge of Jewish Culture — — — — — — — — .03 
Note: Significant correlations are in bold. LGB = lesbian, gay, bisexual; U.S. = United States. 
aRace is effects coded: –1 = White, 1 = Other races. 
bReligion is effects coded: –1 = Christian, 1 = Other religions.  




Secondary analyses. Consistent with Studies 2a and 3, participants in the homophobic 
environment were less certain (M = 1.65, SD = 1.19) of their identity suspicion ratings than in 
the nonhomophobic (M = 2.25, SD = 1.26) environment, F(1, 463) = 27.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .06 
[.03, .09].  
Exploratory analysis. Given the primary mediation results involving peer identity 
suspicion and motivation to conceal—and their strong correlations with downstream costs (see 
Table 3)—Itested a parallel multiple mediation model with these two variables as parallel 
mediators of the social environments’ effect on downstream costs (see Figure 3). The total and 
direct effects of environment on downstream costs were significant. While the total indirect 
effect was also significant, B = –0.29 [–0.40, –0.19], this result was driven by the significant 
indirect effect via motivation to conceal. A contrast comparing the difference between the 
indirect effects via motivation to conceal and peer identity suspicion was significant, B = 0.21 
[0.06, 0.36]. In other words, motivation to conceal—but not peer identity suspicion—mediated 
the effect of environment on downstream costs. Notably, however, these two proposed 
mediators—motivation to conceal and peer identity suspicion—were highly correlated, r(465) = 
.55, p < .001. Conceivably, Steve’s perceived motivation to conceal might indirectly influence 
the perceived likelihood of him incurring downstream costs (to avoid revealing his gender-
nonconforming interest in fashion) via peer identity suspicion (see Figure 4B). Future 
experimental studies are needed to replicate these results and determine the mediational path of 





Figure 3. Exploratory parallel mediation model with peer identity suspicion and motivation to 
conceal mediating the effect of social environment (–1 = nonhomophobic; +1 = homophobic) on 
downstream costs in Study 4a. I report unstandardized coefficients for the paths and bootstrapped 
95% CIs for the indirect paths. 
***p < .001. 
 
Study 4b 
Study 4a provided initial evidence for awareness of how social environments affect 
perceptions of gender-nonconforming, straight-identifying men’s sexuality. Specifically, in the 
homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) environment, participants anticipated more identity suspicion 
among Steve’s peers, increased motivation for Steve to conceal his gender-nonconformity from 
his peers, and his decreased likelihood of entering an art competition to win a scholarship. I 
found support for my theoretical mediation model, suggesting participants intuitively recognize 
how homophobic environments create secondary closets in which straight men conceal behaviors 
and attributes coded as markers of not being straight. I also found support for my hypothesized 









a1 = 0.81***  
a2 = 0.87***  
c’ = –0.29***  
b1 = –0.05  
b2 = –0.29***  
a1b1: –0.04 [–0.12, 0.04] 
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viable model. In the current study, I aimed to replicate the results for my hypotheses for peer 
identity suspicion, motivation to conceal, and my two mediation models using the same-sex 
emotional intimacy profile from Studies 1c and 2b.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. As in Study 4a, I sought to recruit a final sample of 500 
MTurk workers. Of the 636 participants who started the study, 87 (13.7%) did not finish.26 After 
20 additional exclusions, my final sample comprised 529 participants (see Table 1 for 
demographics & exclusions). 
I followed the same procedure as in Study 4a, excluding the measure of downstream 
costs (less relevant to a profile featuring relationships) and restoring the measure of agreement 
with Steve (i.e., that sharing a bed with another guy is no big deal).  
Stimulus materials. As in Studies 1c and 2b, the profile of Steve featured emotional 
intimacy with his same-sex best friend, Connor. 
Measures. Participants completed measures of peer identity suspicion (M = 2.09, SD = 
1.49), motivation to conceal (M = 1.80, SD = 1.54), identity suspicion (M = 35.33, SD = 24.33), 
certainty (M = 1.72, SD = 1.26), and agreement with Steve (M = 1.09, SD = 1.85).  
Results and Discussion 
Primary analyses. Replicating Study 4a, participants perceived a higher probability of 
peer identity suspicion when Steve was situated in the homophobic (M = 3.05, SD = 1.08) than 
nonhomophobic (M = 1.12, SD = 1.18) social environment, F(1, 519) = 381.18, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.42 [.37, .47]. Similarly, they believed Steve would be more motivated to conceal this emotional 
intimacy in the homophobic (M = 2.78, SD = 1.26) than nonhomophobic (M = 0.81, SD = 1.09) 
 
26 Attrition did not differ by condition, χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .908.  
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environment, F(1, 519) = 364.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .41 [.36, .46].27 Replicating all prior studies, 
participants expressed more identity suspicion in the homophobic (M = 38.90, SD = 23.69) than 
nonhomophobic (M = 31.69, SD = 24.47) environment, F(1, 527) = 11.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .02 
[.01, .05].  
Replicating Study 4a, perceived motivation to conceal mediated the effect of social 
environments on identity suspicion, as evidenced by a 95% CI excluding zero (see  
Figure 2). This result strengthens support for the conclusion that participants intuitively 
recognize that homophobic environments create secondary closets in which straight men are 
pressured to conceal behaviors and attributes that call into question their straightness. Further 
replicating Study 4a, both my hypothesized (social environment → peer identity suspicion → 
motivation to conceal) and alternate (social environment → motivation to conceal → peer 








27 Correcting for a Levene’s violation, F(1, 519) = 4.78, p = .029, produced converging results, Welch’s F(1, 510.6) 




Figure 4.). Although I test this mediation model again in Study 5’s novel context, 
determining the causal sequence of peer identity suspicion and motivation to conceal in relation 
to identity suspicion calls for future experimental studies (see Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). 
Secondary analyses. Consistent with Studies 2a, 3, 4a, and with Fein and colleagues 
(1990), participants in the homophobic environment were less certain (M = 1.60, SD = 1.25) of 
their identity suspicion ratings than in the nonhomophobic (M = 1.84, SD = 1.25) environment, 
F(1, 527) = 5.04, p = .025, ηp2 = .01 [.001, .03]. As in Studies 2a and 2b, participants’ agreement 
with Steve did not vary by environment, F(1, 527) < 1. This null effect strengthens my 
confidence in theorizing that identity suspicion does not rely on personal prejudices to arise. 
Despite social environmental effects on identity suspicion, the environment does not seem to 
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Figure 4. (A) Hypothesized and (B) alternate mediation models with social environment (–1 = 
nonhomophobic; +1 = homophobic), peer identity suspicion, and motivation to conceal in 
Studies 4a-5. S4a = Study 4a; S4b = Study 4b; S5 = Study 5. I report unstandardized coefficients 
for all paths and bootstrapped 95% CIs for indirect paths. 
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Chapter 6: Mega-Analysis 
Having found consistent support across eight independent studies for my hypothesized 
effect of social environment on identity suspicion, I turn now to the questions of potential 
confounds, covariates, and moderators. I combined the data from my eight independent samples 
and used mega-analysis to test potential moderators. Mega-analysis is the most robust test of 
moderation due to the increase in power and decreases in false positives and/or negatives 
associated with the pooled (i.e., larger) sample (Costafreda, 2009; Curran & Hussong, 2009; 
Schimmack, 2012; Sung et al., 2014).  
Method 
Given that my focus in Studies 1a-4b was on the effect of homophobic and 
nonhomophobic environments on identity suspicion, I included only these two environments in 
my mega-analyses (total N = 2467). Following Curran and Hussong (2009), I created various 
variables to account for random between-study heterogeneity (please see Appendix D).  
Variables. I included in my analyses those potential confounds, covariates, and 
moderators contained in at least two studies. For example, pooling samples improved my power 
to address on an exploratory basis participant sexuality as a moderating variable (Curran & 
Hussong, 2009), as outlined below. Studies 1a-4b included the following variables, except as 
noted. 
Profile type. I created a dichotomous variable to test for differences between the fashion 
(−1) and emotional expressivity (+1) profiles of Steve. I included only these two profiles in this 
variable because the sexual experimentation and rugby profiles of Steve were only included in 
one study each, resulting in highly unequal group sizes, and because the bulk of my results 
pertain to these two profiles. 
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Suspicion licensing. As outlined earlier, my measure of identity suspicion in Studies 1a-
1c included a suspicion licensing statement that I dropped in all subsequent studies. Accordingly, 
I created a dichotomous variable to test for differences in identity suspicion between studies that 
did (+1) and did not (−1) include the suspicion licensing statement.  
Demographics. Because my vignettes of Steve drew on stereotypes of gay men, I 
included as potential moderators several demographic measures known to predict unfavourable 
impressions of gay men (see Table 1 for descriptives). These demographics included race 
(though results predicting homophobia are mixed across literatures) (Durell, Chiong, & Battle, 
2007; Finlay & Walther, 2003; Hill, 2013; Walch, Orlosky, Sinkkanen, & Stevens, 2010a); older 
age (Johnson, Brems, & Alford-Keating, 1997; Snively et al., 2004; Walch, Orlosky, Sinkkanen, 
& Stevens, 2010b); being male (Johnson et al., 1997; J. L. Nagoshi et al., 2008; Roediger III, 
Meade, Gallo, & Olson, 2014; Snively et al., 2004; Walch et al., 2010b; Warriner, Nagoshi, & 
Nagoshi, 2013); and having relatively lower levels of education (Snively et al., 2004; Walch et 
al., 2010b).  
Participants identified their primary racial group from among six options (White, East 
Asian, South Asian, Black, Hispanic/Latinx, Other). As seen in Table 1, my pooled sample was 
predominantly White, so I created a dichotomous variable to test for differences between White 
(−1) and non-White (+1) participants. Age was selected from a drop-down menu ranging from 
<16 to >50 in one-year increments. Participants reported their sex as Male (1), Female (−1), or 
Intersex (0)28. I measured education from “Some high school” (1) to “Graduate degree” (6). I 
also assessed household income, expecting it to produce similar patterns to education, given their 
frequent positive correlation. Household income was measured from “Under $15,000” (1) to 
 
28 Moderation analyses with participant sex were restricted to male-/female-identifying participants. Only 1 
participant across all studies identified as intersex (see Table 1 in manuscript). 
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“Over $150,000” (8). Although age could serve as a proxy for high school graduation year, I also 
collected the latter information directly (reported range: 1958-2016). As expected, this variable 
was highly correlated with age, r(195) = –.93, p < .001, so I omitted it from my analyses.  
Sexuality. Conceivably, people might view Steve’s sexuality differently as a function of 
their own sexuality. In Studies 1a-2a, participants identified their sexual attraction on a 5-point 
scale from “Only attracted to females” to “Equally attracted to females and males” to “Only 
attracted to males” (including a separate “Unsure” option). I expanded the options available to 
participants in Studies 2b-4b, adding, “Only/Mostly attracted to gender-variant people,” “I am 
attracted to everyone, regardless of their sex or gender,” and “I do not experience sexual 
attraction to others.” Using participants’ self-reported sex, I created an index representing 
sexuality on a continuum from Exclusively Gay to Bisexual to Exclusively Straight, with 
separate categories for Unsure and each of the three new categories in Studies 2b-4b. For 
example, a participant reporting “male” as their sex and “Mostly attracted to females” as their 
sexual attraction was coded Mostly Straight, whereas a participant selecting an identical sexual 
attraction response but reporting “female” as their sex was coded Mostly Gay.  
Given the large proportion (76%) of participants coded as Exclusively Straight in my 
pooled sample, I also created a dichotomous variable to differentiate them (+1) from the other 
participants with diverse sexualities (−1). Expanding my measure of sexuality to include Unsure, 
Pansexual, Asexual, and Attracted to Gender-Variant People resulted in a significant decrease in 
the proportion of participants classified as Exclusively Straight (pre-expansion: 77.8%, post-
expansion: 74.1%), 𝜒2(1) = 4. 17, 𝑝 =  .041. Because a dichotomous variable differentiating 
studies with my initial (−1) versus expanded (+1) measures of sexuality did not significantly 
interact with participants’ dichotomized sexuality to predict identity suspicion, b = −0.91 [−2.14, 
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0.32], t(2458.1) = 1.45, p = .146, subsequent analyses collapse across both versions of my 
sexuality measure. 
Impressions of Steve. People who violate gender stereotypes tend to be less liked than 
those who conform to them (Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Rudman, 2010). These differences 
emerge as early as for 3-year-old children (Sullivan, Moss-Racusin, Lopez, & Williams, 2018). 
More specifically, gender-nonconforming boys tend to draw out negative reactions and behaviors 
from both their peers and adults (Lamb, Easterbrooks, & Holden, 1980; Martin, 1990; Owen 
Blakemore, 2003; R. Young & Sweeting, 2004). In each study, everyone read the same profile of 
a gender-nonconforming young man. As such, no condition differences in perceptions of Steve 
were expected. It is plausible, however, that people who like him more might be less suspicious 
of his identity claim. Further, I speculated that people’s sexuality might influence their 
impressions of Steve. To test both possibilities, I had participants rated Steve on six character 
traits (likeable, trustworthy, friendly, warm, capable, competent) from –3 (Strongly disagree) to 
3 (Strongly agree), averaged to create an “impressions” composite (α = .94). I then tested the 
main effect of impressions and an interaction between social environment, participant sexuality, 
and impressions of Steve. 
Social environment perceptions. Additional measures addressed the potential for 
confounded perceptions of the social environments (on dimensions besides homophobia) 
contributing to different estimates of Steve’s sexuality across experimental conditions. Given the 
high prevalence of homophobic bullying in schools (UK: Bradlow, Bartram, Guasp, & Jadva, 
2017; US: Musu, Zhang, Wang, Zhang, & Oudekerk, 2018), I expected participants to find 
McCormack's (2011a) description of the nonhomophobic environment at Standard High less 
believable than my description of the homophobic environment, despite both being presented as 
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excerpts of McCormack’s article. To control for any such differences, I assessed believability: 
Participants rated how believable they found the description of the social environment they read, 
from –3 (Extremely unbelievable) to 3 (Extremely believable). 
To assess how this environment compared with perceivers’ own social contexts, 
participants rated from –3 (Extremely dissimilar) to 3 (Extremely similar) how similar Standard 
High was to high schools in America today (U.S. high school similarity) and their own high 
school (own high school similarity). Lastly, they rated how similar their closest friends’ attitudes 
toward homosexuality were to the boys described in the environment. I reverse-scored 
participants’ ratings in the homophobic condition, so that across conditions this measure reflects 
similarity to behavioral allyship among participants’ closest friends (friends’ LGB allyship). This 
variable lends additional insight into LGB-related climates among participants’ closest social 
networks. Rather than merely indexing the passive absence (or not) of negative attitudes toward 
LGB folks (as in friends’ pro-LGB attitudes, described later), this measure assesses active 
acceptance and allyship behaviors among participants’ closest friends.  
Self-image. I speculated that personal salience or importance of one’s own gender and 
sexuality might increase one’s attunement to cues of gender and sexuality, and hence proneness 
to expressing identity suspicion in the homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) social environment. 
Accordingly, I asked participants to rate their (dis)agreement with two statements about the 
importance of their gender identity (gender identity self-importance) and sexuality (sexuality 
self-importance) to their self-image from –2 (Strongly disagree) to 2 (Strongly agree). These 




Friends’ pro-LGB attitudes.  I did not query participants’ own attitudes toward LGB 
folks because of concerns that the preceding materials and questions about Steve’s sexuality 
would introduce demand characteristics and socially desirable responding. (Notably, measuring 
these attitudes at the outset could have revealed the study aims, invalidating the results.) Instead, 
participants’ reports about their immediate social network’s attitudes served as a proxy for their 
own attitudes, because the tendency for people to affiliate with people who are similar to them 
(i.e., homophily) is one of the most robust findings in network science (e.g., Mcpherson, Smith-
Lovin, & Cook, 2001). People indicated their friends’ attitudes on a sliding scale situated under 
an emoticon whose facial expression ranged from a strong frown (–2 = Very negative) to a strong 
smile (2 = Very positive). The slider started in the neutral central position to avoid inducing a 
directional bias and changed the emoticon’s expression (in place of anchor values) when moved.  
Social network.  To control for variation in the presence of LGB folks in participants’ 
social networks, I asked them in Studies 1a-1c to “list the first names of up to 10 people you 
personally know who identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual.” If people did not know 10 such 
individuals, I instructed them to list as many as they knew and leave the remaining text boxes 
blank. I then counted how many LGB contacts people listed (M = 4.71, SD = 3.07). 
Results and Discussion 
Data analysis strategy. Prior to analyses, I effects-coded social environments (–1 = 
nonhomophobic; +1 = homophobic), mean-centered continuous moderators at the study level, 
and effects-coded dichotomous moderators. I conducted separate multi-level models regressing 
identity suspicion on social environment, each potential moderator, and their interaction, nested 




Descriptive Statistics for Non-Demographic Variables across Studies 1a-4b. 
 
   Study 
   1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 3 4a 4b 
  Range M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Identity Suspicion 0 to 100 37.94 (28.02) 36.61 (27.72) 32.57 (24.43) 30.15 (27.09) 28.35 (25.45) 24.04 (22.94) 32.45 (25.21) 35.33 (24.33) 
Favorable Impressions –3 to 3 2.00 (0.85) 1.60 (0.93) 1.88 (0.82) 1.95 (0.86) 1.85 (0.79) 1.99 (0.79) 2.04 (0.71) 1.75 (0.90) 
Believability –3 to 3 0.92 (1.70) 0.87 (1.82) 0.96 (1.79) 1.30 (1.54) 1.33 (1.59) 1.19 (1.55) 0.96 (1.77) 1.05 (1.72) 
U.S. High School Similarity –3 to 3 –0.22 (1.84) –0.04 (1.83) –0.18 (1.83) 0.28 (1.79) 0.32 (1.79) –0.08 (1.82) –0.13 (1.90) –0.14 (1.88) 
Own High School Similarity –3 to 3 –0.27 (2.12) –0.38 (2.19) –0.46 (2.11) –0.15 (2.04) –0.11 (2.12) –0.24 (2.08) –0.13 (2.12) –0.18 (2.16) 
Friends' LGB Allyship –3 to 3 0.81 (1.94) 0.73 (1.98) 0.88 (1.99) 0.97 (1.81) 0.65 (1.90) 1.13 (1.90) 1.12 (1.81) 0.97 (1.93) 
Gender Identity Self-Importance –2 to 2 1.02 (0.87) 1.13 (0.89) 0.88 (0.92) 0.87 (0.96) 0.93 (0.97) 1.02 (0.91) 0.91 (0.97) — 
Sexuality Self-Importance –2 to 2 0.72 (1.08) 0.89 (1.07) 0.79 (1.01) 0.69 (1.09) 0.75 (1.06) 0.73 (1.07) 0.66 (1.10) — 
Friends’ Pro-LGB Attitudes –2 to 2 0.80 (1.22) 0.79 (1.19) 0.89 (1.18) 0.90 (1.17) 1.01 (1.13) 1.07 (1.14) 1.16 (1.01) 1.03 (1.17) 
Certainty   0 to 4 — — — 2.13 (1.22) 2.02 (1.16) 2.20 (1.20) 1.96 (1.26) 1.72 (1.26) 
Agreement with Steve –3 to 3 — — — 2.12 (1.28) 1.17 (1.76) — — 1.09 (1.85) 
Peer Identity Suspicion   0 to 4 — — — — — — 2.56 (1.34) 2.09 (1.49) 





Primary analyses. The mega-analytic effect of social environment on identity suspicion 
revealed more identity suspicion in the homophobic (vs. nonhomophobic) environment, b = 4.95 
[3.97, 5.93], t(2458.6) = 9.93, p < .001. 
Exploratory analyses. As seen in Table 5, four variables significantly moderated the 
effect of social environment on identity suspicion: profile type, friends’ LGB allyship, friends’ 
pro-LGB attitudes, and believability. For each of these moderators, I report which group (or 
level) revealed the predicted simple effect of social environment (i.e., more identity suspicion in 
the homophobic than the nonhomophobic environment) significantly more strongly, and whether 
this key effect remained significant across groups (or levels), followed by the alternative simple 
effects tests for completeness. 
Profile type. The hypothesized simple effect of social environment was stronger for the 
fashion profile than the emotional expressivity profile, but was significant for each profile, b = 
6.13 [4.69, 7.57], t(2045.0) = 8.34, p < .001, and b = 3.83 [2.22, 5.44], t(2045.6) = 4.66, p < .001, 
respectively. Though descriptively the effect of social environment was stronger for the fashion 
profile, the profiles did not differ significantly in either environment, both ts < 1, ns. 
Friends’ LGB allyship. The social environment simple effect was stronger for partipants 
whose friends were higher in LGB allyship, but emerged both among participants who rated their 
friends’ LGB allyship relatively lower (–1SD), b = 2.71 [1.33, 4.08], t(2455.5) = 3.86, p < .001, 
and relatively higher (+1SD), b = 7.24 [5.87, 8.62], t(2456.2)= 10.33, p < .001, respectively. 
Higher ratings of friends’ LGB allyship predicted less identity suspicion within the 
nonhomophobic environment, b = –2.22 [–2.96, –1.48], t(2455.7) = 5.89, p < .001, but not the 
homophobic environment, t(2455.6) < 1, ns. 
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Friends’ pro-LGB attitudes. Similarly, the social environment simple effect was stronger 
for partipants whose friends had more pro-LGB attitudes, but emerged both among participants 
who rated their friend’s pro-LGB attitudes relatively less positive (–1SD), b = 2.92 [1.55, 4.30], 
t(2456.6) = 4.17, p < .001, and more positive (+1SD), b = 7.10 [5.72, 8.48], t(2457.9)= 10.12, p < 
.001, respectively. More positive ratings of friends’ pro-LGB attitudes predicted less identity 
suspicion within the nonhomophobic environment, b = –2.22 [–2.96, –1.48], t(2455. 7) = 5.89, p 
< .001, but not the homophobic environment, t(2455.6) < 1, ns.  
Believability. The simple effect of social environment was stronger for participants who 
rated the environmental description as more believable, but significant among participants who 
rated it as relatively less believable (–1SD), b = 4.56 [3.05, 6.07], t(2456.8) = 5.93, p < .001, and 
more believable (+1SD), b = 7.78 [6.39, 9.18], t(2456.8) = 10.93, p < .001, respectively. The 
more participants believed the nonhomophobic environment description, the less identity 
suspicion they expressed, b = –3.21 [–3.97, –2.46], t(2456.0) = 8.34, p < .001. A similar, albeit 
weaker, relationship emerged in the homophobic environment, b = –1.32 [–2.28, –0.36], 
t(2456.3) = 2.71, p = .007. In other words, the more participants tended to take the environmental 
description at face value, the more they also took Steve at his word when he asserted a straight 
identity. Despite this tendency, however, participants who found the descriptions of the 
environments especially believable—seeing them as plausible representations of real-world 
contexts—showed the largest social environment effects on identity suspicion. 
Impressions × participant sexuality. As outlined in my methods, I speculated that 
impressions of Steve might vary as a function of participant sexuality to predict identity 
suspicion. I regressed identity suspicion on effects-coded social environment (–1 = 
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nonhomophobic, +1 = homophobic), participant sexuality (–1 = non-exclusively straight, +1 = 
exclusively straight), mean-centred impressions of Steve, and all possible interactions.  
The main effects of environment and impressions of Steve were significant, b = 5.19 
[4.08, 6.30], t(2453.0) = 9.17, p < .001, and b = –6.16 [–7.52, –4.80], t(2452.3) = 8.89, p < .001, 
respectively. More importantly, the 2-way interaction between impressions of Steve and 
participant sexuality was also significant, b = –1.49 [–2.85, –0.13], t(2452.9) = 2.15, p = .031. 
No other significant effects emerged, although the three-way interaction involving environment 
was trending toward significance, b = 1.27 [–0.09, 2.63], t(2453.7) = 1.83, p = .067.  
Probing the significant two-way interaction revealed that identity suspicion did not differ 
by participant sexuality for participants with relatively less positive impressions of Steve (–1SD), 
t(2452.8) < 1.03, ns. Among participants with relatively more positive impressions (+1SD), 
however, exclusively straight participants reported less identity suspicion than sexually diverse 
participants, b = –1.59 [–3.11, –0.07], t(2453.3) = 2.05, p = .041. A significant simple effect of 
impressions of Steve for both exclusively straight and sexually diverse participants also emerged: 
b = –7.65 [–8.96, –6.34], t(2452.3) = 11.45, p < .001, and b = –4.67 [–7.05, –2.28], t(2452.7) = 
3.84, p < .001, respectively.  
Visual inspection of the social environment effects on suspicion revealed a descriptively 
stronger effect of social environment for sexually diverse than exclusively straight participants. 
Because these analyses are strictly exploratory, I examined whether the social environment could 
shed any light on my observed results. 
Several patterns emerged that clarified the nature of the two-way interaction between 
impressions of Steve and participant sexuality. First, the negative simple effect of impressions 
among sexually diverse participants was significant within the homophobic environment, yet 
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non-significant (though still negative) in the nonhomophobic environment. This pattern could 
suggest that for sexually diverse participants, the relation between identity suspicion and 
impressions depends to some extent on Steve’s social environment.  
Second, the non-significant simple effect of participant sexuality among participants with 
relatively less positive impressions of Steve (–1SD) appeared to vary somewhat across 
environment. Among participants who viewed Steve less positively, exclusively straight 
participants reported more identity suspicion than sexually diverse participants in the 
nonhomophobic environment, but not in the homophobic environment.   
Finally, the negative simple effect of participant sexuality among participants with 
relatively more positive impressions of Steve (+1SD) was nonsignificant (though negative) in 
both environments. These results suggest the original simple effect attained significance due to 
collapsing across environments. While interesting, these descriptive patterns would require 
replication before being given too much credence. As such, I suggest future research explore 
more rigorously the interplay between impressions, participant sexuality, and social environment 
in shaping identity suspicion. 
Table 5 
Mega-Analysis Fixed Effects Estimates for the Effect of Nonhomophobic vs. Homophobic Social 




(Controlling for Moderator) 
 
Moderator  
Environment Effect  
Moderator 
Potential Moderator b (SE) 95% CI  b (SE) 95% CI  b (SE) 95% CI 
Profile Typea 4.98*** 
(0.55) 
[3.90, 6.06]  0.38 
(1.58) 
[-3.76, 4.53]  -1.15* 
(0.55) 
[-2.23, -0.07] 
Suspicion Licensingb 4.84*** 
(0.58) 
[3.71, 5.97]  3.10 
(1.41) 





[2.94, 5.43]  -0.46 
(0.63) 





[4.20, 6.47]  0.01 
(0.58) 







(Controlling for Moderator) 
 
Moderator  
Environment Effect  
Moderator 
Potential Moderator b (SE) 95% CI  b (SE) 95% CI  b (SE) 95% CI 
Agee 4.93*** 
(0.50) 
[3.95, 5.91]  0.01 
(0.05) 
[-0.09, 0.11]  -0.06 
(0.05) 
[-0.16, 0.04] 
Participant Sexf 5.10*** 
(0.51) 
[4.10, 6.10]  1.77*** 
(0.51) 





[3.96, 5.92]  0.28 
(0.40) 





[3.96, 5.91]  0.24 
(0.27) 







[3.74, 5.64]  -6.92*** 
(0.58) 







[4.18, 6.40]  -1.17 
(0.61) 







[4.21, 6.43]  -0.32 
(0.53) 







[3.99, 5.93]  -1.02*** 
(0.26) 







[4.01, 5.95]  -1.20** 
(0.43) 
[-2.05, -0.35]  1.83*** 
(0.43) 
[0.98, 2.68] 




[2.57, 6.77]  -0.32 
(0.35) 





[5.11, 7.14]  -2.26*** 
(0.31) 
[-2.87, -1.66]  0.95** 
(0.31) 
[0.34, 1.56] 




[4.38, 6.65]  -0.53 
(0.27) 
[-1.07, 0.00]  0.38 
(0.27) 
[-0.15, 0.92] 




[4.56, 6.76]  -0.83** 
(0.30) 
[-1.43, -0.24]  0.15 
(0.30) 
[-0.44, 0.75] 
Note. Results come from separate multi-level models regressing identity suspicion on social 
environment (−1 = Nonhomophobic, +1 = Homophobic), each potential moderator, and their 
interaction, nested within studies. Significant results are bolded. LGB = lesbian, gay, bisexual. 
aProfile type was effects coded (−1 = Fashion, +1 = Emotional Expressivity). 
bSuspicion licensing was effects coded (−1 = Suspicion not licensed, +1 = Suspicion licensed). 
cRace was effects coded (−1 = White, +1 = other races). 
dSexuality was effects coded (−1 = Sexually diverse, +1 = Exclusively straight). 
eI omitted High School Graduation Year due to its redundant results with Age.  
fParticipant sex was effects coded (−1 = Female, +1 = Male). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Summary. Overall, my mega-analytic results demonstrated the robustness of the social 
environmental effect on identity suspicion. As seen in Table 5, the effect of social environment 
on identity suspicion remained significant controlling for the influence of each potential 
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moderator. Although the moderation results presented are exploratory and should be interpreted 
with caution, I draw attention to the results for closest friends’ LGB allyship and pro-LGB 
attitudes. Though it may seem intuitive to expect that identity suspicion toward Steve is a 
function, at least to some degree, of homophobia, these results are in line with my theorizing that 
identity suspicion need not arise from personal prejudice. Instead, the suspicion seen in the 
homophobic environment can arise from rational applications of the discounting principle. 
Because the homophobic environment incentives concealment of being gay, the attributionally 
correct response to Steve’s claim to be straight is identity suspicion. What is perhaps more 
interesting, then, is that in the absence of an incentive to conceal being gay in the 
nonhomophobic environment, participants’ closest social networks’ degree of LGB allyship and 




Chapter 7: Study 5 
Replicating the effect of environment on perceptions of Steve’s sexuality across seven 
samples suggests this paradigm is capturing a real effect, consistent with my theorizing about 
identity suspicion in the domain of men’s perceived sexuality. My final study shifts focus to 
testing identity suspicion in a historical context where identity suspicion had extreme 
consequences. Recall my proposition that the critical components of identity suspicion are a 
concealable marked identity, a social environment oppressing this identity (creating the self-
protective incentive to deny having it), and the social coding of certain behaviors as markers of 
the concealable identity. My previous eight studies tested my identity suspicion hypotheses in a 
current context where participants were likely to hold shared cultural knowledge about the 
hidden meaning of the identity cues in the actor’s profile and their implications for the actor. As 
such, this shared cultural knowledge may have predisposed participants to respond in a way that 
supported my identity suspicion hypotheses. To address this potential limitation, in my final 
study I focused on a historical context far removed from my participants: the persecution of Jews 
in medieval Spain that led to the Spanish Inquisition.  
The Spanish Inquisition is one of the most extreme examples of the tragic consequences 
that can occur when identity suspicion runs rampant within a community. However, I reasoned 
that participants were unlikely to share the cultural knowledge of the particular identity 
suspicions that led to the Inquisition, which provided me an opportunity for a non-confounded 
test of my identity suspicion hypotheses. Specifically, it allowed me to test whether 
experimentally varying participants’ information about the identity stigmatization that Jews 
faced in Spain would be sufficient to lead contemporary participants to express the same kinds of 
suspicions about an actor’s identity that led to the Spanish Inquisition.   
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Without attempting to summarize comprehensively the complexity of the Spanish 
Inquisition, I note several key components and refer the reader to more authoritative sources for 
greater detail (e.g., Lea, 2019; Netanyahu, 1995; Pérez, 2005; Plaidy, 1967). In brief, massive 
pogroms in 14th century Spain forced thousands of Jews to convert to Christianity (Netanyahu, 
1995). These conversos (i.e., Jewish converts to Christianity) became the target of “old” 
Christians’ hatred and persecution, and in 1478, Pope Sixtus IV institutionalized the Spanish 
Inquisition with his papal bull, Exigit sinceras devotionis affectus (‘Sincere Devotion Is 
Required’”; Ray, n.d.). The Spanish Inquisition was an attempt, in part, to identify conversos 
who had converted only nominally to Christianity, while secretly continuing to practice Judaism 
(Netanyahu, 1995, 1999). As the Inquisition waged on, accusations of observing Jewish rites 
became increasingly subjective, and a host of trivial behaviors came to stand as indication of 
secretly practicing Judaism (Netanyahu, 1995). By the time Spain’s first Grand Inquisitor, 
Tomás de Torquemada, died, an estimated 2000 people had been accused of heresy and burned 
at the stake (Ray, n.d.). While it is impossible to know how many of the conversos had secretly 
retained their Jewish faith, careful scholarly estimates indicate that, in reality, no more than 1% 
of the converso population continued to practice Judaism (Netanyahu, 1999). 
I adopted the conditions that preceded the Spanish Inquisition as the identity-stigmatizing 
social environment for Study 5 (hereafter called Jewish persecution environment). For the 
identity-affirming environment, I drew on work by Ramón Menéndez Pidal and Américo Castro 
on la convivencia (i.e., the coexistence; Glick, 1992), an earlier time when Muslims ruled 
medieval Spain and Jews and Christians—despite being second-class citizens—were essentially 
equals and allowed to live in relative peace (Castro, 1971; Wolf, 2009). This depiction of la 
convivencia is contested by some (e.g., Sánchez-Albornoz, 1975), but for the purposes of my 
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study, what mattered most was that this period was posited as one of relative religious tolerance, 
and specifically one of relatively equal social standing between Christians and Jews (hereafter 
called Jewish tolerance environment).  
 I focused on religious identity as my concealable identity. Specifically, I created a profile 
of a man (Josephus) who identified as a Christian but displayed certain private behaviors more 
common among Jews than Christians. I included cues seen as stereotypically Jewish (hence, 
nonconforming for Christians) at the time of the Spanish Inquisition to replicate the identity cue 
inconsistency from my earlier profiles of Steve.  
My hypotheses mirrored those of my earlier studies. When Josephus was described as 
living during the period of Jewish persecution rather than the period of relative religious 
tolerance, I predicted that participants would (a) express more identity suspicion (i.e., be less 
likely to perceive Josephus as the Christian he said he was), (b) expect Josephus’s community to 
be more suspicious of his religious identity (were they to learn about his behaviors associated 
with Judaism), and (c) perceive him as more motivated to conceal these behaviors. Testing these 
hypotheses in the current context allowed me to test whether merely providing contemporary 
participants with information about the extreme stigmatization Jews faced in this particular 
period—without any explicit reference to the Spanish Inquisition and without providing deeper 
knowledge of its history—would be sufficient to lead these participants to express the same 
suspicions of a converso’s Christian identity that fueled the Spanish Inquisition.   
Method 
Participants and procedures. I aimed for a slightly larger sample of MTurk workers to 
increase power for my only study testing identity suspicion in this domain. Initially, 393 
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participants started the study; 43 (10.9%) did not finish.29 After 8 additional exclusions, my final 
sample comprised 342 participants (see Table 1 for demographics & exclusions). 
I followed a similar procedure to Studies 4a and 4b, with updated materials.  
Stimulus materials. I revised the study content to address religious identity in medieval 
Spain.  
Social environments. I randomly assigned participants to read one of two social 
environment descriptions, presented as excerpts from a medieval Spanish history textbook 
(O’Callaghan, 1975). Participants in the Jewish persecution environment read this description:  
Anti-Jewish prejudice was widespread in Medieval Spanish society during the period of 
Christian rule. At one point, the Christian rulers forced Jewish citizens to convert to 
Christianity or be expelled from the Spanish peninsula, while at other times they 
oppressed Jewish citizens by imposing a number of legal restrictions on them. For 
example, Jewish people were not allowed to participate fully in the social and economic 
life of their communities. They were legally prohibited from certain professions and from 
holding public office. Their communities were periodically targeted by mob violence in 
organized attacks that saw many Jewish people killed or driven from their homes. Openly 
identifying as Jewish during this period was very dangerous. 
Participants assigned to the Jewish tolerance environment read this description: 
Religious tolerance was widespread in Medieval Spanish society during the period of 
Muslim rule. Openly identifying as Christian or Jewish during this period was not 
considered dangerous, because both groups were granted religious freedom through a set 
of provisions called the dhimmi. Under these provisions, neither Christians nor Jewish 
 
29 Attrition did not differ by condition, χ2(1) = 0.63, p = .429. 
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people were forced to convert to Islam, but were instead permitted to continue practicing 
their religious faith. While Christians and Jewish people were equally considered second-
class citizens, members from both groups could fully participate in the social and 
economic life of society. In exchange for these privileges, Christians and Jewish people 
were required to pay a special tax that Muslims did not have to pay. 
I relied to some extent on my participants’ lack of familiarity with the specifics of the 
Spanish Inquisition and la convivencia, enabling me to guide their impressions of these historical 
periods through carefully balanced descriptions. However, I controlled for their pre-existing 
knowledge of both periods to ensure my hypothesized effects were not confounded by subject 
expertise. 
Profile. All participants read the following profile of a man named Josephus. Wording in 
brackets was included in the Jewish persecution versus Jewish tolerance environments, 
respectively: 
A man named Josephus Alfonsi lived in Medieval Spain during the period of 
[Christian/Muslim] rule. He worked as a doctor and was a noted poet of his time. 
Although he came from a long line of Jewish Spaniards, Josephus’ parents converted to 
Christianity several years before he was born. Accordingly, Josephus was baptized and 
raised as a Christian. When he became an adult, he continued to identify as a Christian. 
He married a woman from a Jewish background who converted to Christianity shortly 
before they got married. Josephus and his wife baptized their children in the Christian 




Josephus set up his professional practice near his home, which was close to the 
Jewish part of his city. A historian who studied an archive of letters that Josephus wrote 
during his lifetime noted that he maintained a number of private practices that were 
customary to the Jewish community and not generally practiced by most Christians. For 
example, both of Josephus’ sons were circumcised, a traditional practice in the Jewish 
community that was not widely practiced by Christians of the time. Some of his letters to 
close friends and family included Hebrew, the language of the Jewish community, and he 
appears to have taught his sons at least some Hebrew because some of their letters to him 
also included Hebrew. Josephus and his family also followed Jewish dietary traditions. 
For example, unlike most Christians of the time, they did not eat pork. The historian who 
studied Josephus’s letters noted, however, that in his letters to professional colleagues 
and other official correspondence, Josephus identified himself as a Christian with the 
customary practice of signing his name with the symbol of a fish (a common symbol of 
Christianity). 
Several points related to this profile bear mentioning. First, although each behavior I 
included was used as grounds for criminal investigation during the Spanish Inquisition (Kamen, 
2014; Netanyahu, 1995), and is connected with Jewish culture in some way, none is, in and of 
itself, indicative of religious identity, just as Steve’s gender-nonconforming characteristics are 
closely associated with stereotypes of gay men, but not actually diagnostic of sexuality. 
Nonetheless, I intended for these religiously coded behaviors to prime participants to associate 
Josephus with Judaism. 
Second, Josephus’s explicit claim to be a Christian, together with the behavioral and life 
history cues I provided, should lead participants to associate him with Christianity. I suspected, 
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however, that when Josephus was situated in an environment where Jews were persecuted, 
participants would be suspicious of his religious identity because of the inconsistency of his 
identity cues. As in Steve’s profiles, I included this identity cue inconsistency to foster a state of 
attributional ambiguity. In doing so, I was able to examine whether—as in prior studies— the 
social environment participants read about shaped their interpretation of the identity cue 
inconsistency.  
Measures. After reading the environment and profile descriptions, everyone completed 
measures of impressions (α = .92), identity suspicion, certainty, peer identity suspicion, 
motivation to conceal, as well as measures of various potential confounds, moderators, and 
covariates noted below (see Table 6 for descriptive statistics). 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Nondemographic Potential Moderators and Covariates in Study 5. 
Moderator Range M (SD) 
Identity Suspicion 0% to 100% 41.52 (28.81) 
Certainty 0 to 4 2.05 (1.19) 
Peer Identity Suspicion 0 to 4 2.55 (1.10) 
Motivation to Conceal 0 to 4 2.46 (1.20) 
Importance of Religion 0 to 6 2.30 (2.23) 
Favorable Impressions –3 to 3 1.57 (0.93) 
Knowledge of Medieval Spain 0 to 4 0.77 (0.79) 
Knowledge of Spanish Inquisition 0 to 4 1.11 (0.85) 
Knowledge of La Convivencia 0 to 4 0.35 (0.73) 
Knowledge of Christian Culture 0 to 4 2.33 (1.04) 
Knowledge of Jewish Culture 0 to 4 1.37 (0.84) 
Friends’ Attitudes Toward Jews –2 to 2 4.11 (0.86) 
Friends’ Attitudes Toward Christians –2 to 2 4.14 (0.99) 
 
Identity suspicion. Participants read, “How likely do you think it is:” that (a) 
“Josephus’s personal faith is Christian,” and (b) “Josephus’s personal faith is Jewish.” As before, 
participants indicated their responses on a sliding scale from 0% (No chance at all) to 100% 
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(Absolutely guaranteed), with sliders set at 50% (Maybe/Maybe not). As elsewhere, I report only 
analyses of my main hypothesis. As before, I reverse-scored participants’ ratings so that higher 
scores index more intense identity suspicion. 
Peer identity suspicion. Participants rated the likelihood of identity suspicion among 
Josephus’s peers (i.e., “If other people in Josephus's city learned about the Jewish customs he 
practiced, how likely do you think it is that they would question that Josephus is a Christian?”) 
from 0 (Not at all likely) to 4 (Extremely likely). 
Motivation to conceal. Next, participants indicated how motivated they perceived 
Josephus was to conceal his religious nonconformity from his peers (i.e., “How much do you 
think Josephus was motivated to avoid acknowledging to others the Jewish customs he 
practiced?”) from 0 (Not at all motivated) to 4 (Extremely motivated). 
Potential confounds. In prior studies, I measured perceptions of the social environment 
as potential confounds. Here, I assessed historical knowledge and familiarity with religious 
cultures. 
Historical knowledge. As stated earlier, I expected most participants would not be 
intimately familiar with the details of the Spanish Inquisition or la convivencia. To confirm this 
assumption, I assessed participants’ pre-existing knowledge by asking them how much they 
knew about medieval Spanish history, the Spanish Inquisition, and la convivencia, assessing 
each on a scale from 0 (Nothing at all) to 4 (A great deal). As expected, participant knowledge of 
all three was very low: medieval Spanish history (M = 0.77, SD = 0.79); Spanish Inquisition (M 
= 1.11, SD = 0.85); and la convivencia (M = 0.35, SD = 0.73). 
Religious knowledge. Although all participants read a profile description noting 
behaviors coded as Jewish at the time of the Spanish Inquisition, I anticipated participants might 
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evaluate the profile using their current knowledge of Christianity and Judaism. Accordingly, 
participants rated their knowledge of both Christian and Jewish culture today, on scales from 0 
(Nothing at all) to 4 (A great deal). In this U.S. American sample, participants were more 
knowledge about Christian (M = 2.33, SD = 1.04) than Jewish (M = 1.37, SD = 0.84) culture 
today, t(341) = 17.19, p < .001. 
Potential moderators. Because my environment descriptions involve religious identity, I 
included measures of attitudes toward religious groups. 
Attitudes toward religious groups. As in prior studies, I did not ask participants about 
their own attitudes (for reasons discussed in Study 1a). Instead, participants’ reports about their 
immediate social network’s attitudes served as a proxy for their own attitudes. Specifically, I 
asked participants to rate their closest friends’ general attitudes toward Jewish people and toward 
Christians. They responded on a sliding scale below an emoticon whose facial expression 
changed from a strong frown (–2 = Very negative) to a strong smile (2 = Very positive) as the 
slider was moved from its neutral central starting position. 
Demographics. The demographic measures included the following new variables.  
Religious identity. Conceivably, participants might view Josephus’s religious identity 
differently as a function of their own religious identity. Participants selected which religious 
groups they identified with from a list of nine groups (Buddhist, Christian-Catholic, Christian-
Protestant, Christian-Other, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Non-religious). Participants who did 
not identify with any of these groups had the option of specifying their own group (5.8% of the 
sample). The majority of my sample identified as some form of Christian (52.6%) or non-
religious (38.0%). Only 0.9% of the sample identified as Jewish. 
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Importance of religion. Similarly, participants might interpret my experimental materials 
differently based on the importance of religion to them. Participants indicated the importance of 
religion in their life from 0 (Not at all important) to 6 (The most important thing in my life). 
Results and Discussion 
Data analytic strategy. I followed my established data analytic strategy and effects-
coded social environment (–1 = Jewish tolerance; +1 = Jewish persecution). 
Primary analyses. Consistent with my first hypothesis, participants were more 
suspicious of Josephus’s Christian identity when he was described as living during a period of 
Jewish persecution (M = 51.03, SD = 29.79) than tolerance (M = 31.89, SD = 24.32), F(1, 340) = 
42.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .11 [.06, .16].30 Correcting for participants’ non-additivity across their raw 
percent likelihood estimates produced converging results (see Table 2).  
Having accumulated a large amount of evidence in support of my identity suspicion 
hypothesis, I aimed to compare the distributions of participants’ identity suspicion ratings in key 
environments across all of my studies. Accordingly, I calculated percentile ranks of identity 
suspicion ratings by social environment across Studies 1a-5. Aiding a clear comparison of social 
environment effects on identity suspicion across paradigms, I further calculated percentile rank 
averages in the nonhomophobic and homophobic social environments in Studies 1a-4b. As seen 
in Figure 5., identity suspicion ratings split early on in both paradigms, such that by the 10th 
percentile, the identity-stigmatizing environments produced more identity suspicion than the 
identity-affirming/-tolerating environments, respectively. Both paradigms retained this 
environmental split until the 100th percentile, suggesting the effect of social environment on 
identity suspicion is robust across percentile ranks. 
 
30 Correcting for a Levene’s violation, F(1, 340) = 9.74, p = .002, produced converging results, Welch’s F(1, 328.3) 
= 42.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .11 [.07, .17]. 
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Figure 5. Percentile ranks of identity suspicion by social environment across Studies 1a-5. For Studies 1a-4b, only the average 
percentile ranks of the (non)homophobic social environments are presented. Error bars represent pooled SEs. NH = nonhomophobic 



































Supporting my second hypothesis, participants also believed Josephus’s community 
would be more suspicious of his religious identity—were they to find out about his private, 
religiously coded behaviors—when he was described as living in the Jewish persecution 
environment (M = 2.91, SD = 1.05) than the Jewish tolerance environment (M = 2.18, SD = 
1.03), F(1, 340) = 42.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .11 [.06, .17]. Per my third hypothesis, participants 
perceived Josephus would have been much more motivated to conceal his behavior in the Jewish 
persecution environment (M = 3.02, SD = 1.03) than the Jewish tolerance environment (M = 
1.90, SD = 1.09), F(1, 340) = 96.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .22 [.16, .28].  
Mediation. As in Studies 4a and 4b, the data supported my theoretical mediation model 
(see  
Figure 2). That is, participants’ perceived motivation for Josephus to conceal his religiously 
coded behaviors mediated the social environment effect on identity suspicion. Across three 
studies and two domains, my data have consistently demonstrated that participants intuitively 
recognize the implications of identity-stigmatizing environments for secondary closets. This 
increases my confidence that the theoretical mechanism driving identity suspicion is the 
incentive in identity-stigmatizing environments to conceal behaviors and attributed socially 
coded as identity cues.  
Further replicating Studies 4a and 4b, both my hypothesized (social environment → peer 
identity suspicion → motivation to conceal) and alternate (social environment → motivation to 










Figure 4.). Contrary to Studies 4a and 4b, however, the indirect effect in the alternate 
model was descriptively larger than in the hypothesized model and the direct effect was non-
significant. In sum, after evaluating these two mediation models across three samples, no clearly 
superior model emerged. I conclude that further experimental studies are needed to ascertain 
causal sequence. 
Table 7 
Regression Estimates—b (SE)—for the Effect of Social Environment on Identity Suspicion 








Environment Effect  
Moderator 
Moderator b (SE) 95% CI  b (SE) 95% CI  b (SE) 95% CI 
Age 9.42*** 
(1.47) 
[6.53, 12.30]  0.29 
(0.16) 
[−0.04, 0.61]  −0.26 
(0.16) 
[−0.58, 0.07] 
Participant Sexb 9.56*** 
(1.48) 
[6.65, 12.46]  0.56 
(1.48) 









S4a: a = 0.87*** 
S4b: a = 0.99*** 
S5:  a = 0.56*** 
S4a: b = 0.28*** 
S4b: b = 0.46*** 
S5: b = 0.51*** 
S4a: c’ = 0.57*** 
S4b: c’ = 0.52*** 
S5: c’ = 0.08 
S4a: ab = 0.24 [0.16, 0.33] 
S4b: ab = 0.45 [0.35, 0.56] 









Environment Effect  
Moderator 
Moderator b (SE) 95% CI  b (SE) 95% CI  b (SE) 95% CI 
Racec 9.38*** 
(1.60) 
[6.22, 12.53]  −3.45* 
(1.60) 





[6.70, 12.48]  2.84 
(1.47) 





[6.66, 12.44]  0.21 
(1.29) 





[6.70, 12.48]  −0.98 
(0.82) 
[−2.59, 0.63]  −0.95 
(0.82) 
[−2.56, 0.66] 
Importance of Religion 9.62*** 
(1.46) 
[6.74, 12.49]  −1.67* 
(0.66) 
[−2.96, −0.38]  0.49 
(0.66) 
[−0.81, 1.78] 
Favorable Impressions 10.35*** 
(1.61) 
[7.18, 13.52]  −8.57*** 
(1.53) 
[−11.59, −5.56]  −0.18 
(0.88) 
[−1.92, 1.55] 




[6.68, 12.48]  −0.68 
(1.89) 
[−4.40, 3.04]  −1.52 
(1.89) 
[−5.23, 2.20] 




[6.70, 12.49]  −1.95 
(1.74) 
[−5.37, 1.47]  −1.69 
(1.74) 
[−5.11, 1.73] 




[6.63, 12.44]  −1.03 
(2.04) 
[−5.05, 2.98]  −1.48 
(2.04) 
[−5.50, 2.53] 




[7.04, 12.83]  −3.13* 
(1.42) 
[−5.93, −0.33]  1.39 
(1.42) 
[−1.41, 4.19] 




[6.69, 12.55]  −0.46 
(1.78) 
[−3.96, 3.04]  0.51 
(1.78) 
[−2.99, 4.01] 




[6.48, 12.15]  −5.74*** 
(1.47) 
[−8.62, −2.86]  1.89 
(1.47) 
[−0.99, 4.77] 




[6.76, 12.51]  −4.31* 
(1.70) 
[−7.65, −0.97]  −0.28 
(1.70) 
[−3.62, 3.06] 
Note. Significant results are in bold.  
aSocial environment is effects coded (–1 = identity-tolerating; +1 = identity-stigmatizing). 
bParticipant sex is effects coded (–1 = Female, +1 = Male). 
cRace is effects coded (–1 = White, +1 = Other races). 
dReligion is effects coded (–1 = Christian, +1 = Other religions). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Exploratory analyses: Moderation. As seen in Table 7, only participant education 
moderated the effect of social environment on identity suspicion. Among participants with 
relatively less education, identity suspicion was higher in the Jewish persecution (vs. tolerance) 
environment: b = 11.42 [7.61, 15.23], t(338) = 5.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .09 [.05, .14]. This difference 
persisted less strongly but still significantly among participants with relatively more education, 
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despite being much weaker: b = 5.75 [1.86, 9.63], t(338) = 2.91, p = .004, ηp2 = .02 [.005, .06]. 
Given the exploratory nature of the moderation analyses analyses and the lack of consistent 
moderation by education level in Studies 1a-4b, Iinterpret them cautiously. I do highlight, 
however, that the effect of social environment on identity suspicion remained significant when 






Chapter 8: General Discussion 
Fundamentally, this work explores people’s intuitive theories of the closet. Originally a 
metaphor to describe concealment of gay or lesbian identity in a homophobic environment, the 
closet has since been broadly generalized to encompass concealment of any stigmatized identity. 
Given this broad generalization, I hypothesized that people intuitively recognize that identity-
stigmatizing environments incentivize the concealment of these identities in the proverbial closet 
(provided the identities are of a concealable nature). I further reasoned that this recognition 
should lead people to become suspicious of others’ public claims to hold a contrasting, non-
stigmatized identity (i.e., demonstrate identity suspicion). Across nine experimental studies, I 
hypothesized and found consistent evidence that when an actor claimed to have a non-
stigmatized identity (e.g., straight), observers were more suspicious of his identity claim if he 
was situated in an environment where the contrasting identity (e.g., gay) was stigmatized. By 
contrast, when the environment did not stigmatize the contrasting identity, observers were 
significantly less suspicious of the actor’s identity claim. In most of my studies, I described the 
actor having certain attributes stereotypically associated with the stigmatized identity, which 
predictably augmented observers’ identity suspicion in the stigmatizing environment. However, 
even when the actor’s attributes were stereotypically associated with the contrasting non-
stigmatized identity, observers still expressed suspicion of his identity claim when he was 
situated in the identity-stigmatizing (vs. -affirming) environment (Study 3). These results 
indicate that an identity-stigmatizing environment oppresses not only people with the stigmatized 
identity, but potentially everyone in the environment because it casts a shadow of suspicion over 
anyone’s claim to the contrasting, non-stigmatized identity. 
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I theorized the mechanism driving the environmental effect on identity suspicion was 
participants’ recognition of the incentive to conceal same-sex attraction (Studies 1a-4b) and 
Jewish faith (Study 5) in the identity-stigmatizing environment (i.e., homophobic schools and 
Jewish persecution pre-Spanish Inquisition, respectively). In Studies 4a-5, I found that observers’ 
perception of the actor’s motivation to conceal behaviors or attributes stereotyped as cues of the 
stigmatized identity mediated the social environmental effect on participants’ identity suspicion. 
These results support my theorizing and suggest observers recognize the constraints of identity-
stigmatizing environments for everyone situated within those environments. Not only are people 
with the stigmatized identity incentivized to conceal it (i.e., primary closet), everyone is 
incentivized to conceal behaviors and attributes stereotyped as cues of the stigmatized identity 
(i.e., secondary closet) to avoid suspicion they possess the stigmatized identity.  
In Studies 4a-5, I also explored further consequences of identity suspicion. Specifically, I 
found that when the environment was identity-stigmatizing (vs. -affirming/-tolerating), observers 
attributed greater motivation for the actor to conceal from his peers any behaviors or attributes 
that might be stereotypically coded as cues of the stigmatized concealable identity. In all three 
studies, this finding was mediated by observers’ belief that the actor’s peers would suspect he 
possessed the stigmatized identity, were they to learn of his behavior or attributes. Unfortunately, 
switching the mediating and outcome variables of this model produced a second, equally viable 
model. In this second model, observers’ perception of the actor’s motivation to conceal mediated 
their perception of the likelihood his peers would suspect he possessed the stigmatized identity if 
they learned of his stereotyped behaviors or attributes. Although both models are compatible 
with the suggestion that observers may have inferred identity-stigmatizing environments create 
both primary and secondary closets, my results preclude drawing firm conclusions about whether 
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perceived motivation to conceal drives perceived peer identity suspicion, or vice versa. Future 
studies are needed to experimentally test the directionality of this process. 
Contributions to Attribution Theory 
My findings make a significant contribution to the literature on person perception by 
extending classic attribution theory principles to the context of identity attribution. Previous 
work on attribution theory has focused on attributions about relatively limited aspects of a 
person, such as particular attitudes, abilities, beliefs, motivations, or emotions. In everyday life, 
however, people make attributions about not only these limited aspects of others, but also much 
broader characteristics, such as inferring their religious, sexual, or political identities from 
observations of their behavior. It is thus valuable to investigate whether classic attribution 
principles, such as the discounting principle, apply when observers make attributions about these 
sorts of broader characteristics. My research was centered on the discounting principle’s logic-
based premise that causes of behavior are discounted to the extent that alternative causes exist 
(Kelley, 1971). My robust finding that observers expressed identity suspicion consistent with the 
logical inferences mandated by the discounting principle indicates the predictions of attribution 
theory can indeed be extended to identity attributions.    
Although rational thought and logical decision-making make up the foundation of the 
discounting principle, one of the most robust findings in attribution theory is people’s failure to 
invoke this principle (i.e., the fundamental attribution error [FAE; Ross, 1977] or correspondence 
bias [Gilbert & Malone, 1995]). That is, people tend to disregard situational determinants of 
behavior, even when they are made exceedingly obvious, and incorrectly draw dispositional 
inferences about an actor based only on their behavior (Gilbert, 1998; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; 
Ross, 1977). Moreover, the FAE seems to function automatically and to be very difficult to 
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overcome (see Gilbert, 1998). There are, however, specific contexts in which observers tend to 
overcome the FAE. 
Through careful observation of studies demonstrating the FAE, Fein and colleagues 
(1990) discovered that “when contextual information suggests that more than one motive may 
underlie an actor's behavior, the suspicion that is aroused may inhibit [observers] from making a 
correspondent inference” (p. 754). Indeed, suspicion appears to interrupt the automatic process 
behind the FAE and trigger more careful deliberation on the part of observers (Fein, 1996). 
Intriguingly, then, suspicion appears to promote rational thinking among observers. Insofar as 
rational thought is lauded as a superior way of thinking, this effect of suspicion seems positive. 
However, by directing my focus on identity attributions, in contrast to the bulk of attribution 
theory’s focus on dispositional attributions, I highlight the potentially troubling implications of 
rational thought in the domain of identity. That is, insofar as the discounting principle is rational, 
and insofar as suspicion reflects observers’ use of the discounting principle, the logical 
conclusion is that the identity suspicion demonstrated in my studies is rational. In other words, 
the discounting principle implies it is rational to be suspicious of an actor’s claim to an unmarked 
concealable identity when the actor’s social environment stigmatizes the contrasting marked and 
concealable identity. Further, this suspicion is all the more rational if some of the actor’s 
behaviors and attributes are socially coded as markers of the stigmatized identity.  
Rational suspicion, however, comes with a price, as seen in the following examples. Boys 
who are perceived as gender-nonconforming are frequent targets of homophobic bullying, even 
when these boys profess to be straight, in part because these gender non-conforming behaviors 
augment others’ suspicions that the boys might secretly be gay (Friedman, Koeske, Silvestre, 
Korr, & Sites, 2006; Mahan et al., 2006; Norman & Galvin, 2006; Phoenix, Frosh, & Pattman, 
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2003; D. C. Plummer, 2001; Taylor et al., 2011). This victimization has both short- and long-
term negative effects on victims’ mental and physical health (Friedman et al., 2006; Phoenix et 
al., 2003; Poteat & Espelage, 2007; Poteat, Scheer, Digiovanni, & Mereish, 2014; A. L. Roberts, 
Rosario, Slopen, Calzo, & Austin, 2013; Swearer, Turner, Givens, & Pollack, 2008; Taylor et al., 
2011). A great deal of masculinities research has focused on men’s fear of other’s suspicions that 
they might be gay and how this fear of suspicion leads them to defensively adopt negative 
ideologies (e.g., antifemininity, femmephobia, homophobia, transphobia, misogyny) and engage 
in aggression and violence toward men who identify as or are perceived as gay or transgender 
(Hoskin, 2019; Hunt et al., 2016; McCormack & Anderson, 2010b, 2014a; McCreary, 1994; C. 
T. Nagoshi, Cloud, Lindley, Nagoshi, & Lothamer, 2019; J. L. Nagoshi et al., 2008; Pascoe & 
Diefendorf, 2019; D. Plummer, 2014; Rivera, Dasgupta, & Rivera, 2016; S. Roberts, Anderson, 
& Magrath, 2017; Smith et al., 2015; Warriner et al., 2013; Worthen, 2014; though see 
McCormack & Anderson, 2014b for an account of the declining influence of homophobia on 
men's gender in the US). In another context, Muslims flying in the Western world must contend 
with how they are often misrecognized by airport security personnel and other travelers as threats 
to safety based on the suspicion they might secretly be terrorists (Blackwood, Hopkins, & 
Reicher, 2015; Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011; McNamara & Reicher, 2019; Meer, Martineau, & 
Thompson, 2012).  
In each of these examples, identity-stigmatizing environments create incentives to closet 
a stigmatized concealable identity. This incentive triggers observers’ rational suspicion of others’ 
“true” identity, particularly of those exhibiting behaviors or attributes socially coded as markers 
of the stigmatized concealable identity. While rational, the identity suspicion elicited by these 
environments can have multiple negative consequences, ranging in severity and temporality.  
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Identity Suspicion and Identity Cue Inconsistency 
It is important to note that all but one of the actor profiles in my studies featured identity 
cue inconsistencies. Two alternate process models could account for the relations between these 
inconsistencies, observers’ awareness of identity stigmatization, and their suspicion of an actor’s 
claim to possess the non-stigmatized identity. The first model suggests that when observers focus 
on how a concealable identity is stigmatized in an environment, it leads them to be suspicious of 
an actor’s claims to possess the contrasting, non-stigmatized identity. This suspicion motivates 
observers to scrutinize actors’ behavior for cues that conflict with their identity claim. If such 
cues are detected, they will tend to augment the observer’s suspicions about the actor’s claim to 
possess the non-stigmatized identity.   
The second model suggests that when an observer detects inconsistencies in an actor’s 
identity cues, the observers subsequently focuses on contextual factors to resolve the actor’s 
identity cue inconsistency, such as the social environment’s stigmatization of a concealable 
identity. Indeed previous work on person perception indicates that when observers perceive 
inconsistent identity cues in an actor’s behavior, they engage in more effortful attributional 
processing and looks for other information—such as relevant environmental contexts—that can 
resolve the identity cue inconsistency (Marchand & Vonk, 2005; Vonk, 1998).  
The difference between these models is subtle but important. In the first model, identity 
suspicion is triggered by awareness of identity stigmatization. This suspicion can then be 
augmented by identity cue inconsistencies. In the second model, identity suspicion is triggered 
by the identity cue inconsistency, which then leads the observer to engage in more effortful 
attributional analysis in an attempt to resolve the identity cue inconsistency.  
 
 101 
Both process models are consistent with most of my findings. I included identity cue 
inconsistencies in all but one of my actor profiles, suggesting the second model might well 
account for my findings. In contrast, however, participants in every study always read the social 
environment description before the actor’s profile, suggesting their interpretation of the actor’s 
profile was influenced by the presence/absence of identity-stigmatization in the environment, 
which supports the first model. A more definitive test of the two models comes from my data in 
Study 3, where I contrasted gender-(non)conforming profiles. Importantly, the gender-
conforming profile did not contain any identity cue inconsistency. Instead, the actor’s 
stereotyped behavior was consistent with his claim to be straight. If the first model best accounts 
for the identity suspicion process, then even the gender-conforming (i.e., suspicion-free) profile 
should trigger identity suspicion in the homophobic environment. By contrast, if the second 
model best accounts for identity suspicion’s process, then the gender-conforming profile should 
not generate suspicion, even if it is situated in the homophobic environment, because the model 
indicates that observers should only use environmental cues to discount an actor’s identity claims 
when they detect inconsistent identity cues.   
The results from Study 3 supported the first model over the second one. Despite the 
identity cue consistency of the gender-conforming profile, participants who read that the actor 
attended a homophobic school were still more suspicious of his identity than participants who 
read he attended a nonhomophobic school. In line with the first model, I conclude that people’s 
awareness of an environment’s stigmatization of a concealable identity triggers their suspicion of 
an actor’s claims to the contrasting non-stigmatized identity, and that this suspicion can then be 
augmented by inconsistencies in the actor’s identity cues. That is, in environments that 
stigmatize a concealable identity, even people whose behaviors and attributes signal the 
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contrasting, non-stigmatized identity fall prey to observers’ identity suspicion. While it is 
exciting to think of the implications of this finding for applied settings, I must first consider a 
potential alternative explanation.  
The cognitive asymmetry attending the binary classification of marked and unmarked 
categories renders the unmarked category ignored and assumed as default (Brekhus, 1996, 1998, 
2003; Heller, 2011). In other words, people tend to subconsciously attribute unmarked identities 
to others unless a certain cue or set of cues signal a marked identity (see Brekhus, 1996). It is 
possible, then, that the actor’s explicit claim to be straight in the gender-conforming profile 
triggered participants’ suspicion because it drew attention to an identity that, theoretically, was 
already assumed. Drawing attention to one’s unmarked identity flips the cognitive script of 
paying disproportionate attention to marked identities and ignoring unmarked ones, and thus 
seems strange. Perhaps the actor’s claim to be straight when no questions of his straightness 
existed made participants suspicious of whether he “truly” is straight. If this explanation bears 
out, then the suspicion that I observed may have been initially triggered by the unusualness of 
the actor’s claim to an unmarked identity, and this suspicion may then have led observers to 
engage in more effortful attributional reasoning that took into account the homophobic 
environment’s incentive to conceal non-straight identities.  
While certainly plausible, I view this explanation as unlikely to account for my results 
because I designed the actor’s profile to ensure that his explicit claim to be straight did not arise 
in an unusual way. I did this by prefacing his identity claim with the following statement from 
the interviewer, “When I got to the part [of the interview] where I asked students about their 
sexuality ….” After reading this introduction, participants should logically attribute the reason 
for the actor’s identity claim to the interviewer’s question. If the interviewer asked all students 
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about their sexuality as a standard part of the interview, then there is no ground for suspicion of 
the actor’s sexuality on the basis of his claim to be straight. As per the discounting principle, this 
attribution should quell any suspicion the actor’s identity claim might otherwise have raised 
about his “true” sexuality. Assuming, then, that this result attests to the power of identity-
stigmatizing social environments and not the unusualness of the actor’s identity claim, I next 
consider its implications for real-world contexts.  
A wealth of research suggests that gender-nonconformity—especially among boys and 
men—is frequently cause for negative evaluations and victimization (Coyle, Fulcher, & 
Trübutschek, 2016; Friedman et al., 2006; Norman & Galvin, 2006; A. L. Roberts et al., 2013; 
Swearer et al., 2008). What my research implies is that a homophobic social environment drives 
these negative evaluations and victimization. Furthermore, this work suggests homophobic 
environments have negative implications for not only gender-nonconforming individuals, but 
also for those who conform to conventional gender roles and stereotypes. That is, in homophobic 
schools, even boys who identify as and “act” straight (i.e., embody socially coded cues of a 
straight identity) can be targets of identity suspicion. Supporting this implication is past work 
demonstrating that male peer groups in high school use homophobic language and questioning of 
each other’s sexuality to police gendered behavior (Pascoe, 2005, 2007; Reigeluth & Addis, 
2016) and that straight youth are also victimized by homophobic bullying (Phoenix et al., 2003; 
Poteat & Espelage, 2007; Poteat et al., 2014; Swearer et al., 2008). Taken together, these 
findings suggest homophobic environments have deleterious implications not only for men who 
identify or are perceived as non-straight, but also for men who identify as straight.  
Identity-Affirming Social Environments 
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Another intriguing result in my work is the lack of difference in identity suspicion ratings 
between the gender-nonconforming and gender-conforming profiles in the nonhomophobic 
environment in Study 3. In line with my theorizing, this result implies that the social coding of 
certain behaviors and attributes as cues of sexuality is a byproduct of homophobic social 
environments. When the school environment was described as nonhomophobic, it did not matter 
whether the actor’s passion was fashion design or playing rugby, because neither contained 
informative value in terms of bolstering suspicion of his claim to be straight. As articulated in 
identity suspicion theory, where no incentive to closet a marked concealable identity exists, 
behavior no longer holds diagnostic value for attributing the marked identity, because actors who 
hold the marked identity have no reason to hide it from others.  
The theoretical implications of nonhomophobic social environments extend beyond my 
work. For example, the bulk of masculinity studies documents and theorizes masculinities within 
an arguably homophobic—though increasingly less so (McCormack & Anderson, 2014b)—
social context. This contextualization raises the possibility that theories like precarious manhood 
theory (Bosson & Vandello, 2011; Bosson, Vandello, Burnaford, Weaver, & Arzu Wasti, 2009) 
or the majority of masculinity measures (for a critical review, see Thompson & Bennett, 2015) 
are bound by the homophobic contexts in which they are demonstrated. As such, precarious 
manhood theory may be less a demonstration of men’s inherent aversion to being seen as 
feminine because of the negative implications for their perceived masculinity and sexuality, and 
more a symptom of homophobic environments that, by incentivizing concealment of non-straight 
identities, raise suspicion that anyone claiming to be straight might actually be gay. 
More recent masculinity theories are shifting focus away from “traditional” or “toxic” 
masculinities and highlighting ways in which younger generations of men are redefining what is 
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means to be masculine (e.g., Anderson, 2009; Bridges & Pascoe, 2014; Elliott, 2016). While 
each of these new theories highlights ways in which the nature of masculinity is changing, 
inclusive masculinity (Anderson, 2009) attributes this change most explicitly to decreasing rates 
of homophobia in the western world (McCormack, 2011b; McCormack & Anderson, 2014b). 
Across a slew of studies, both qualitative and quantitative, Anderson and colleagues demonstrate 
that young men are not only rejecting the homophobic masculinity of their predecessors, but also 
actively including young gay men in their social circles. Moreover, these researchers have found 
that young men increasingly report engaging in intimate physical—and occasionally sexual—
contact with other young men (e.g., cuddling, spooning, sharing a bed, kissing) without 
perceiving a threat to their masculinity or even straightness (Anderson, 2009; Anderson & 
McCormack, 2015, 2016; McCormack, 2011a, 2014; McCormack & Anderson, 2010a; 
Robinson, Anderson, & White, 2018). This body of work aligns with my theorizing: 
nonhomophobic environments nullify the diagnosticity of—and remove any “need” for—
socially coded behaviors and attributes as markers of sexuality. 
Identity Suspicion and Observers’ Prejudice 
Given that I theorize identity suspicion as an outcome of environments that stigmatize 
certain concealable identities, it may seem intuitive to think it also functions because of 
observers’ stigmatizing attitudes. Neither my theoretical analysis nor my findings support this 
intuition, however. In a mega-analytic test of potential moderators of identity suspicion, I found 
very consistent patterns between participants’ ratings of their closest social network’s LGB 
allyship (i.e., active acceptance of LGB folks) and pro-LGB attitudes. While higher ratings on 
both measures were generally associated with less identity suspicion, an interaction between 
these measures and the social environment qualified this main effect. Specifically, in the 
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homophobic environment, these measures had no effect on participants’ identity suspicion 
ratings, which suggests identity suspicion in the homophobic environment does not depend on 
individual bias.  
Of interest, identity suspicion ratings in the nonhomophobic condition diverged as a 
function of participants’ ratings of their closest social network. Here, the higher participants 
rated their closest social network’s LGB allyship and pro-LGB attitudes, the less identity 
suspicion they reported. One potential explanation for the interaction’s pattern is that personal 
prejudicial attitudes do not determine responses in the homophobic environment because the 
rational response—due to the environmental incentive to conceal—is identity suspicion, whereas 
the nonhomophobic environment contains no grounds for suspicion, allowing personal 
prejudicial attitudes to exert more influence. I point out that identity suspicion was always lower 
in the nonhomophobic than homophobic environment, even among participants who rated their 
closest social network relatively lower on LGB allyship and pro-LGB attitudes. In sum, the 
environmental effect on identity suspicion was robust to participants’ individual bias, though 
bias did affect identity suspicion ratings in the nonhomophobic environment.  
Suspicious Mindsets 
It is important to note than in none of my studies were participants entirely certain of the 
actor’s identity. Mean identity suspicion ratings in the identity-afforming environments always 
differed from 0%, and in the identity-stigmatizing environments they always differed from 
100%. This uncertainty in identity attribution is in line with work by Fein and colleagues 
showing that when people recognize the possibility of an ulterior motive accounting for an 
actor’s behavior, they tend to avoid firm decisions and report greater uncertainty in those 
decisions as a result of their suspicion (Fein, 1996; Fein & Hilton, 1994; Fein et al., 1990). 
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Replicating these findings, participants in my studies also reported less certainty in their identity 
suspicion ratings in the identity-stigmatizing environments, relative to the identity-affirming 
environments. The identity-stigmatizing environments also attested to participants’ greater 
uncertainty through their greater variability in identity suspicion ratings, as evidenced by my 
data’s continual violation of Levene’s assumption of homogeneity of variance. Taken together, 
these results suggest that participants in the identity-stigmatizing conditions recognized the 
environment’s incentive to self-present as straight (Studies 1a-4b) or as Christian (Study 5), 
which made them more suspicious of the actor’s claimed identity and less certain of their own 
identity suspicion rating.  
While my results largely align with Fein and colleagues’ work on suspicious mindsets 
(Fein, 1996; Fein & Hilton, 1994; Fein et al., 1990), they depart from Fein and Hilton (1994) 
regarding participants’ liking of an actor with potential ulterior motives. Fein and Hilton reported 
that their participants liked the actor in their studies less as a function of the participants’ 
suspicion toward the actor’s “true” motives. In my studies, however, participants reported 
strongly liking the actors, and these ratings never differed by condition. I highlight two important 
distinctions between my work and that of Fein and Hilton’s that I believe account for this 
difference. First, participants in my studies were “removed, impassionate observers of an 
obviously [personally irrelevant] actor” (p. 173), whereas participants in Fein and Hilton’s 
studies were directly affected by the actor’s potential deception. Thinking of real-world 
examples of identity suspicion (e.g., Salem witch hunt, McCarthyism in the US), though, it is 
highly likely that people felt directly affected by an actor’s suspected deception. In such cases, I 
would also expect participants’ liking of an actor to decrease. Second, in Fein and Hilton’s 
research, the suspected incentive for the actor to behave inauthentically involved self-promotion. 
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By contrast, in my research the suspected incentive for the actor to behave inauthentically 
involved self-protection. Observers may feel some sympathy towards actors who behave 
inauthentically to protect themselves from stigmatization, whereas they may primarily have 
contempt for actors who behave inauthentically to seek advantages. 
Implications for Identity Panics 
There have been many notorious episodes of identity panics in history where people’s 
suspicions of one another’s identity claims ran rampant in communities (e.g., the Spanish 
Inquisition, Salem witch-hunts, McCarthyism). My results raise the provocative notion that the 
rampant identity suspicion defining these historical episodes may have been the result of 
people’s application of logical attribution principles in a context where a concealable identity 
was highly stigmatized. Indeed, my results indicate that merely knowing a concealable identity is 
highly stigmatized is sufficient to trigger rational suspicion of the authenticity of people’s claims 
to possess the contrasting, non-stigmatized identity. Further, my results suggest that observers 
need not share the identity stigmatizing attitudes to experience identity suspicion. In a 
community where witches are heavily persecuted, the discounting principle suggests it is logical 
to suspiciously wonder whether one’s friends and neighbors might be professing to be devout 
Christians to protect themselves from persecution. Similarly, in a context where communists are 
vulnerable to being fired from positions in the civil service and education, the discounting 
principle suggests it is logical to suspiciously wonder whether one’s coworkers or teachers might 
be presenting themselves as patriots to protect themselves from being fired.  
When identity suspicion runs rampant in a community and leads to destructive 
consequences, it is tempting to assume these suspicions are fueled by irrational psychological 
forces, such as paranoid delusions or extreme prejudices on the part of the individuals expressing 
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the suspicion. However, my results suggest that identity suspicion may be fueled by nothing 
more than logical application of attribution theory’s discounting principle in a context where 
some concealable identity is highly stigmatized. The stigmatization of any identity may often be 
rooted in irrational prejudices, but the suspicion of people’s claims to possess the contrasting, 
non-stigmatized identity may be entirely rational, even when these suspicions extend the 
oppressive consequences of identity stigmatization.   
The results from Study 5 are particularly relevant to this point. I provided participants 
with information modeled on the social context that led to the Spanish Inquisition. The 
Inquisition arose out of people’s suspicions that conversos, Spaniards of Jewish background who 
had converted to Catholicism (Netanyahu, 1995), were secretly practicing the Jewish faith, 
which was considered heresy. The authenticity of the conversos’ claims to the Catholic faith was 
questioned because practitioners of Judaism were severely oppressed at the time and many of the 
conversos’ ancestors had been forced to convert to Catholicism to avoid being exiled or killed. A 
converso who retained stereotypically Jewish cultural practices, such as following Jewish dietary 
customs or maintaining social ties to the Jewish community, was particularly likely to be accused 
of being a secret heretic by the Inquisition (Netanyahu, 1995). In Study 5, my participants 
demonstrated the same patterns of suspicion that led to the Spanish Inquisition, even though my 
participants did not share the eliminationist anti-Semitism that was prevalent in that notorious 
period. My results show that merely knowing that Jews were heavily oppressed in early modern 
Spain and that a particular converso had habits and practices that were stereotypically associated 
with Jews was sufficient to lead contemporary participants to be suspicious of the claim that he 
was a devout Christian. The chilling implication of this result is that the suspicion of conversos 
that played a key role in driving the Inquisition may have represented a logical application of 
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attribution theory’s discounting principle. In other words, while irrational anti-Semitic prejudices 
and hatred were the source of the oppressive conditions that incentivized Jews to convert to 
Catholicism in early Modern Spain, the suspicion of the authenticity of these conversos that 
fueled the Inquisition could potentially have been due to rational application of attributional 
logic.  
While it is provocative to discover that contemporary observers may replicate some of 
the identity suspicion that featured in historical episodes of identity panic, it is important to note 
that the pattern and dynamics of identity suspicion may often require specific cultural 
knowledge. My theory suggests that within identity-stigmatizing social environments, people 
come to code certain behaviors and attributes as markers of the stigmatized identity. Before 
identity suspicion can result in such social codes, however, observers must share certain cultural 
knowledge. If people do not share an understanding of the hidden meaning of certain behaviors 
and attributes as cues of stigmatized identities, identity suspicion cannot take flight because 
consensus will not be reached over which identities are (un)marked (Brekhus, 1996). Further, 
this cultural knowledge is context specific. Behaviors and attributes socially coded as identity 
markers in one context do not necessarily translate to other contexts. For example, Young (2007) 
details how, as an academic Black man, he is perceived as gay when he returns to the “ghetto” 
where he grew up because of his education. When he returns to his home, however, his education 
holds no diagnostic value regarding his sexuality. For Young, cultural knowledge does not 
translate between the two spaces he inhabits. As a result, the same attribute carries different 




Due to this dissertation’s post-positivist location, my research on identity suspicion 
within the domain of men’s perceived sexuality and its intersections with masculinity and 
homophobia is necessarily limited. While sexuality and gender are, in reality, neither binary nor 
essentially fixed (e.g., Diamond, 2008; Gamson, 2000; Mizzi & Walton, 2014; Savin-Williams, 
2017), my research portrays them as both. In aligning my work with Brekhus's (1996) theory of 
social markedness, I have taken up an approach that reinforces the incorrect perception of 
sexuality as a binary. In response, I re-emphasize that my research does not endeavor to capture 
the reality of people’s sexualities. Rather, my research examines social discourses and ways of 
thinking about others’ sexuality. In doing so, I have engaged certain notions of sexuality that do 
not reflect reality, such as the common social perception of straight and gay as contrasting and 
essential sides of a binary (Elizabeth, 2013; Leck, 2000; Morgan & Davis-Delano, 2016; Waites, 
2005). While my decision to do so was motivated by studying real-world perceptions and 
processes described in various literatures and experienced throughout my life as a gay man, I 
wrestle with the tension of perpetuating inaccurate, potentially harmful portrayals of sexual and 
gender diversity as binaristic and the need to understand and speak to identity suspicion in a 
language understood and appreciated by both my academic community and society at large. 
Ultimately, I have decided the benefits of amassing this knowledge outweigh the potential harms 
of how sexuality and gender are portrayed in my studies. Nonetheless, I draw attention to this 
issue here—and also did so extensively in each of my studies’ debriefing—with the hope of 
clarifying that sexuality and gender are neither fixed identities nor reducible to binaries in service 
of establishing the superiority of heterosexuality or heteronormativity.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
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Hypothetical materials.  Although I believe this work is exciting and opens avenues into 
future research on and applications of identity suspicion, it also has several limitations. First, 
each of my studies rely—in large part—on hypothetical materials. While this is not out of the 
ordinary for social psychological experiments nor person-perception research, it does beg the 
question of how identity suspicion develops in the real world. In response, I point out several 
factors that attenuate some of the limitations associated with my hypothetical materials. First, 
Fein and colleagues’ work on suspicious mindsets was conducted in the lab with groups of 
participants led to believe they were interacting with each other (Fein, 1996; Fein & Hilton, 
1994; Fein et al., 1990; Marchand & Vonk, 2005; Vonk, 1998). As such, I have good reason to 
believe that the suspicion elicited in my studies translates beyond the hypothetical nature of some 
of my research materials.  
Second, of the four key environmental descriptions in my studies (nonhomophobic/ 
homophobic; Spanish Inquisition/la convivencia), only the homophobic environment was not 
directly based on existing documentation of real environments. As already described, I based my 
description of the nonhomophobic environment almost verbatim on McCormack's (2011a) 
description of Standard High, a private school in England where he conducted over 500 hours of 
participant observation in a 5-month ethnographic study. This point is worth re-emphasizing 
because the nonhomophobic environment was judged less believable than the homophobic 
environment by participants in each study, even though the latter was based on the former to 
maximize internal validity. Despite participants’ skepticism of the nonhomophobic environment, 
it is not a hypothetical environment created for the purposes of this study. This fact increases my 
confidence that these findings relate to real-world contexts. Nonetheless, future studies would 
benefit from directly demonstrating social environmental effects on identity suspicion in the lab 
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where I can examine how identity suspicion arises in live social interactions between observers 
and targets.  
Demand characteristics. My experimental materials foregrounded information relevant 
to identity suspicion. The social environment descriptions—with the exception of the 
extracurricular environment in Study 1b—focused on one feature of the environment that was 
directly related to the identity in question; the actor always explicitly claimed to be straight; and 
my measures of identity suspicion were overt (i.e., not couched among a host of filler questions 
to make them less conspicuous). It may be argued that these aspects of my experimental 
materials gave rise to demand characteristics that augmented identity suspicion in my studies. To 
this point, it is worth considering whether people would spontaneously suspect the actor’s 
sexuality if not overtly asked about it, and how more subtle cues of him being straight would 
affect identity suspicion ratings.  
To the first question of whether people would spontaneousy suspect someone’s sexuality 
if not overtly asked about it, a lifetime of experience as a gay man in a homophobic society leads 
me to say “yes.” Beyond personal experience, I can anecdotally report that participants who 
mentioned the actor’s sexuality in their open-ended response of their impression of him (which, 
importantly, came before my identity suspicion measure) tended to acknowledge some 
uncertainty about him being straight, even when it was couched in full acceptance of whatever 
his sexuality might be. Further, a host of research across multiple decades affirms the suspicion 
of men’s sexuality when demonstrating any form of gender-nonconformity (e.g., Bem, 1998; 
Berke et al., 2017; Connell, 1992; Grisard, 2017; Hunt et al., 2016; Lamb et al., 1980; Martin, 
1990; Owen Blakemore, 2003). Indeed, men’s gender expression is so strictly policed that real or 
perceived threats to their masculinity tend to produce a host of negative responses, from physical 
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aggression (Bosson & Vandello, 2011; Bosson et al., 2009; Brown, Baughman, & Carvallo, 
2018; Netchaeva, Kouchaki, & Sheppard, 2015; Talley & Bettencourt, 2008; Vandello & 
Bosson, 2013) to less support for social equality (Cassino, 2016; Kosakowska-Berezecka et al., 
2015; Phoenix et al., 2003; Weaver & Vescio, 2015) to increased prejudice against and social 
distancing from gay men (Hunt et al., 2016; Rivera & Dasgupta, 2016; Talley & Bettencourt, 
2008). Accordingly, I maintain that the identity suspicion in my studies arises spontaneously, 
regardless of how it is inquired about. 
Regarding the influence of more subtle identity cues on identity suspicion, I would expect 
somewhat of a drop in identity suspicion, though I cannot know how much. When comparing 
identity suspicion ratings in response to the actor’s love of fashion, I found that Sample 3 
produced noticeably less identity suspicion than Samples 1a, 2a, and 4a. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 4, I cannot empirically conclude the cause of this drop is the elimination of several 
gender-nonconforming components of the actor’s profile, but such an interpretation is certainly 
plausible. I can imagine that cuing the actor’s straight identity through mention of a girlfriend 
instead of a verbal claim, for example, might similarly produce a drop in identity suspicion 
because of the perceived diagnosticity of such a behavioral cue. On the other hand, I can also 
imagine that when identity is cued only through behavior, the cues associated with the marked 
identity would receive greater consideration because of the disproportionate attention paid to 
marked (vs. unmarked) identities. Further, if we consider how suspicious mindsets facilitate 
more effortful cognitive processing (Fein, 1996; Marchand & Vonk, 2005), then I would suspect 
that the identity-cue inconsistency, despite being less overt, would still trigger more careful 
consideration of context, resulting in higher ratings of identity suspicion in the homophobic 
environment. Future research could address this question by contrasting a profile with an explicit 
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claim to be straight with a profile where Steve’s straight identity is cued through behavior to see 
whether identity suspicion varies as a function of these identity cues. 
Non-0% identity suspicion in identity-affirming environments. In all of my samples, 
the median level of identity suspicion differed from 0% (i.e., a total lack of suspicion). Why, 
despite the lack of environmental incentive to hide the identity in question, did participants still 
suspect the actor’s identity? Concerning Samples 1a-4b, it may be tempting to read into the 
social environment and conclude it is really better described as “anti-homophobic” than 
nonhomophobic. With the boys in the social environment (i.e., Standard High) taking such an 
active stance against homophobia, perhaps the profile reinforced the idea that homophobia exists 
in contexts beyond the school, and that perhaps concealment in those environments might carry 
over to the school setting. Such an idea is certainly plausible. It does not, however, explain non-
0% identity suspicion in Sample 5.  
In Samples 1a-4b, participants’s closest friends’ allyship behaviors and attitudes toward 
LGB folks negatively predicted identity suspicion in the nonhomophobic environment. 
Accordingly, participants with social networks that were rated as less positive toward LGB folks 
also rated their suspicion of the actor’s claim to be straight as higher. Hence, some of the non-0% 
ratings in the nonhomophobic environment must be attributed to attitudes toward LGB folks. 
Again, however, this finding does not explain the non-0% ratings in the identity-affirming 
environment in Sample 5.  
Anecdotally, after examining participants’ explanation for their identity suspicion rating 
with their actual rating, it quickly became apparent that the two often misaligned. For example, 
one participant in the nonhomophobic condition wrote, “Well, Steve is still young and I don't 
know anything about him, but he says he is straight, so he proabaly (sic) is,” and rated their 
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suspicion at 41%. Another participant in the homophobic condition wrote, “Well his talk about 
fashion and wanting to help the interviewer with his wardrobe makes it sound like a possible gay 
guy. The interview had a leaning toward gay,” but rated their suspicion at only 10%. Taken 
together, these various considerations make it clear that several things could be going on in the 
nonhomophobic environment to cause identity suspicion ratings to differ from 0%. Future work 
on this topic should look to measure identity suspicion in a way that produces less “noise” in the 
data, such as a 9-point scale anchored by “straight” and “not straight.” It would be interesting to 
see if changing the response scale would prevent some of the discordant responses seen in my 
data. 
Shared cultural knowledge.  Given my theorized effect of social environments on 
identity suspicion and the interpretation of socially coded identity cues, I must mention that the 
first eight studies are somewhat confounded by the homophobic tenor of society in general. 
Because my participants were immersed in a society that is homophobic, they should be 
particularly sensitive to behaviors and attributes socially coded as markers for men of being gay. 
If anything, though, this fact lends greater credibility to the effect of nonhomophobic 
environments on identity suspicion, because participants randomly assigned this environment 
would bring with them a propensity to interpret Steve’s gender-nonconformity as a sign of him 
being gay, regardless of the social environment. When considered from this perspective, the 
nonhomophobic environment’s impact on participants’ identity suspicion ratings is all the more 
remarkable because it overcomes identity cues that have strong diagnostic value in participants’ 
daily identity attributions.  
I addressed the potential limitation of real-world cultural knowledge on my experimental 
materials through my study on the Spanish Inquisition. By selecting a historical event that is far-
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removed, both geographically and temporally, from my participants, I was confident participants 
would not enter my experiment with shared cultural knowledge of the hidden meanings behind 
certain behaviors and attributes during the historical event. Nonetheless, I controlled for 
participants’ pre-existing knowledge of the Spanish Inquisition, la convivencia, medieval Spain, 
Judaism, and Christianity. None of these potential confounds accounted for my results, and I 
found an even stronger effect of identity suspicion than in the previous studies.  
Cuing identity suspicion.  In Studies 1a-4b I used gender-nonconforming behaviors and 
interests to cue participants’ suspicion of the actor’s claim to be straight. An interesting future 
extension of this approach would be to examine the influence of over-the-top displays of gender 
conformity on participants’ identity suspicion. Might men’s overcompensation in the form of 
exaggerated masculine displays similarly trigger suspicion as gender-nonconforming behaviors 
and attributes do in my studies? Past research suggests it might. 
In their seminal paper on the masculine overcompensation theory, (Willer, Rogalin, 
Conlon, & Wojnowicz, 2013) argued that when men’s masculinity is threatened, they often 
attempt to reinstate it through exaggerated or extreme displays of masculinity. They cite Adams, 
Wright, and Lohr's (1996) infamous finding that men who scored relatively higher (vs. lower) on 
a measure of homophobia also tended to experience more sexual arousal when watching two 
men having sex, suggesting that homophobia may serve as a form of overcompensation among 
same-sex attracted men who worry about the implications of their desire for their perceived 
social status. Similarly, Lewis, Hesse, Cook, and Pedersen (2020) highlight several familiar 
stereotypes around masculine overcompensation (e.g., “men with large trucks and small penises, 
mid-life crisis affairs, purchases of convertibles sports cars, endorsement of female-hostile 
pornography, and exaggerated stories of conquests or manly pursuits” p. 59), suggesting a certain 
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degree of skepticism toward some of men’s masculine behaviors. Accordingly, it may be the 
case that in homophobic environments displaying too much—as with too little—masculinity may 
trigger observers’ identity suspicion. 
Gender.  The bulk of my studies focus on men and the socially coded behaviors and 
attributes that cue attributions of them being gay. This focus was intentional, given the extensive 
and multidisciplinary scholarship demonstrating disproportionate policing of boys’ and men’s 
gender (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; McCreary, 1994; Pascoe, 2005; Reigeluth & Addis, 
2016). Further, past scholarship has found that gender-nonconforming girls and women tend to 
be viewed less negatively and higher in social status than their male counterparts (Coyle, 
Fulcher, & Trübutschek, 2016; McCreary, 1994; Sirin, McCreary, & Mahalik, 2004; but see 
Berdahl, 2007 for evidence that masculine women experience more sexual harassment in the 
workplace). Because society tends to obsess over men’s gender-nonconformity more so than 
over women’s gender-nonconformity, it seems unlikely that identity suspicion would emerge in 
response to women’s masculine behaviors or attributes, but this remains an empirical question. 
Perhaps, given society’s higher respect for masculinity than femininity (e.g., Bem, 1993), 
women’s sexuality may not be questioned on account of their demonstrating masculine 
behaviors, but for failing to demonstrate feminine behaviors. Research on the actual gendered 
traits that distinguish same-sex attracted men and women from their heterosexual counterparts 
may have some implications for what gendered cues observers could potentially use as 
indications of sexual identity. This research shows that both the presence of feminine interests 
and the absence of masculine interests tends to distinguish same-sex attracted men from 
heterosexual men (Bem, 1998). However, the absence of feminine interests tends to distinguish 
same-sex attracted women from heterosexual women, while the majority of both groups of 
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women report the presence of masculine interests (Bem, 1998). If people are intuitively aware of 
these differences in the relative diagnosticity of feminine and masculine cues, then I might find 
that they would use disinterest in stereotypically feminine activities and not interest in 
stereotypically masculine activities as a cue of same-sex identity for female actors. Again, this 
possibility presents an empirical question for future studies to answer. 
Communication of suspicion. The current studies demonstrate how social environments 
influence identity suspicion, but they do not address how identity suspicion spreads throughout a 
community. A key aspect in my theory of identity suspicion is the way in which identity-
stigmatizing social environments not only promote identity suspicion, but also exacerbate the 
perceived diagnosticity of socially coded behaviors and attributes. To test this component of my 
theory, I am in the process of designing a serial reproduction study in which participants 
communicate profile descriptions of actors to subsequent participants in the study, similar to the 
transmission of information in the childhood game of Telephone. The aim of this study is to 
examine how the social environment influences the transmission of information, and in 
particular, the resolution of attributional ambiguity regarding the actor’s identity.  
Schemas and inconsistency resolution.  Vonk (1998) argued and demonstrated that 
when participants perceive inconsistencies in an actor’s behavior, they engage in more elaborate 
processing to resolve the inconsistencies. Because of this effortful processing, “free recall of the 
behaviors is better than when only consistent behaviors are presented (e.g., Srull, 1981)” (p. 
850). Vonk hypothesized and found that when observers activated a relevant schema to explain 
an actor’s behavioral inconsistency, they did not engage in effortful processing and subsequently 
performed worse on a free recall task. These findings raise an interesting question where identity 
suspicion is concerned. Specifically, I have argued that identity suspicion incentives people to 
 
 120 
closet both stigmatized concealable identities and the behaviors and attributes socially coded as 
markers of those identities. Given the shared cultural understanding in Western society of “the 
closet,” it is possible that the closet represents a highly accessible schema that allows participants 
to quickly resolve the inconsistency of the actors’ identity cues in my studies. Considering this 
possibility lends an alternate explanation to the pattern of results for LGB allyship and pro-LGB 
attitudes’ moderation of environmental effects on identity suspicion. Specifically, if the 
homophobic environment activates the schema of the closet, this might circumvent effortful 
processing and the activation of bias. In the nonhomophobic environment, however, the schema 
of the closet is irrelevant, which might result in more effortful processing on the part of 
participants, thus resulting in the activation of personal bias in ratings of identity suspicion. This 
remains an intriguing avenue for future work on identity suspicion. 
Identity Suspicion when Marked Identities Experience Positive Distinctiveness  
Future work could explore an intriguing twist on my current approach to studying 
identity suspicion. Whereas in this work I study observers’ perceptions of an actor’s claim to 
possess an unmarked identity, future work could examine observers’ perceptions of an actor’s 
claim to a marked identity, as a function of environment. Attribution theory leads me to predict 
that observers would express little to no suspicion of such an identity claim in an environment 
that stigmatized the identity. In such an environment, the actor would not appear to have ulterior 
motives for claiming the stigmatized identity. However, if the actor were situated in a setting 
where the marked identity is not only tolerated, but potentially even celebrated for its difference 
from the unmarked identity, then observers might suspect the actor adopted the marked identity 
to enjoy the benefits of positive distinctiveness. The “lesbian-until-graduation” (LUG) and “4-
year queer” stereotypes (Lewin, 2011; Marler, 2014) may be examples of such a scenario, at 
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least in the minds of general society, because these stereotypes express skepticism about the 
authenticity of young women’s claims to have a lesbian or queer identity when the expression of 
that identity is situated in the context of a liberal-minded college or university setting where 
expressing a less mainstream identity may be positively valued.  
Conclusion 
Closets breed suspicion. In social environments that stigmatize a concealable identity, 
people with the identity are incentivized to closet it. This incentive, however, casts a suspicious 
shadow over everyone in the environment. No one’s claim to the contrasting, non-stigmatized 
concealable identity can be fully trusted because the desire to escape stigmatization may 
motivate such claims. In such environments, social codes emerge in which inconspicuous 
behaviors and attributes take on cultural-specific hidden meaning as cues of the stigmatized 
identity. In such cases, not only are people with the stigmatized identity motivated to closet it, 
everyone is driven to closet those behaviors and/or attributes that may cause observers to become 
suspicious of their identity. 
Across nine studies, I demonstrated that people look to the social environment to resolve 
inconsistencies in an actor’s identity cues. When the social environment stigmatized a 
concealable identity, participants reported greater identity suspicion, both when an actor 
exhibited a behavior or attribute that cued the stigmatized identity and when he did not. This 
latter point is of particular importance, because even an actor with consistent identity cues was 
regarded with greater suspicion as to his ‘true’ identity when he was situated in an identity-
stigmatizing environment. This finding speaks to the power of social environments in driving 
identity suspicion. More generally, this work highlights the costs of stigmatizing concealable 
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identities for not only the immediate targets of such stigma, but also for all those who exist in the 
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Measures in Viewing Order by Study 
 
Studies 
1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 3 4a 4b 5 
      O-E: SH O-E: SH  
      PIS PIS  
      MC MC  
       O-E: PIS  
      DC   
O-E: Actor O-E: Actor O-E: Actor O-E: Actor O-E: Actor O-E: Actor O-E: Actor O-E: Actor O-E: Actor 
Imp: Actor Imp: Actor Imp: Actor Imp: Actor Imp: Actor Imp: Actor Imp: Actor Imp: Actor Imp: Actor 
IS IS IS IS IS IS IS IS IS 
   Certainty Certainty Certainty Certainty Certainty Certainty 
   Agree: Actor Agree: Actor   Agree: Actor  
   O-E: IS O-E: IS O-E: IS O-E: IS O-E: IS O-E: IS 
        PIS 
        MC 
        O-E: PIS 
IS: In 5 Years IS: In 5 Years IS: In 5 Years IS: In 5 Years IS: In 5 Years IS: In 5 Years IS: In 5 Years   
  O-E: IS 5 Yrs       
Self-Image Self-Image Self-Image Self-Image Self-Image Self-Image Self-Image   
O-E: SH O-E: SH O-E: SH O-E: SH O-E: SH O-E: SH   O-E: MS 
SE: PC SE: PC SE: PC SE: PC SE: PC SE: PC SE: PC SE: PC K: PC 
SN SN SN       
Friends’ Atts Friends’ Atts Friends’ Atts Friends’ Atts Friends’ Atts Friends’ Atts Friends’ Atts Friends’ Atts Friends’ Atts 
AttnCheck AttnCheck AttnCheck AttnCheck AttnCheck AttnCheck AttnCheck AttnCheck AttnCheck 
Engagement Engagement        
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O-E: Purpose O-E: Purpose O-E: Purpose O-E: Purpose O-E: Purpose     
Suspicious Suspicious Suspicious Suspicious Suspicious Suspicious Suspicious Suspicious Suspicious 
O-E: WS O-E: WS O-E: WS O-E: WS O-E: WS O-E: WS O-E: WS O-E: WS O-E: WS 
  Use Data       
  O-E: WN       
AnonFeed AnonFeed AnonFeed AnonFeed AnonFeed AnonFeed AnonFeed AnonFeed AnonFeed 
Demographics Demographics Demographics Demographics Demographics Demographics Demographics Demographics Demographics 
Re-Consent Re-Consent Re-Consent Re-Consent Re-Consent Re-Consent Re-Consent Re-Consent Re-Consent 
Note. O-E: SH = open-ended: thoughts on Standard High after reading the social environment description; PIS = peer identity 
suspicion; MC = motivation to conceal; O-E: PIS = open-ended: explain peer identity suspicion ratings; DC = downstream costs; O-E: 
Actor = thoughts on the actor after reading his profile; Imp: Actor = 6-item composite: impressions of actor; IS = identity suspicion; 
Agree: Actor = agreement with Steve; O-E: IS = open-ended: explain identity suspicion rating; IS: In 5 Years = identity suspicion 
rating if Steve were re-interviewed in 5 years’ time; O-E: IS 5 Yrs = open-ended: explain IS: In 5 Years rating; SE: PC = social 
environment: potential confounds (believability, own high school similarity; U.S. high school similarity; friends’ LGB allyship); K: 
PC = knowledge: potential confounds (medieval Spain, Spanish Inquisition; la convivencia; Jewish culture; Christian culture); SN = 
social networks; Friends’ Atts = closest friends’ attitudes toward LGB folks (Studies 1a-4b), Jewish people (Study 5), and Christians 
(Study 5); AttnCheck = attention check questions; Engagement = engagement check; O-E: Purpose = open-ended: perceived study 
purpose; Suspicious = was the participant suspicious of any aspect of the study; O-E: WS = open-ended: why suspicious (if “Yes” to 
Suspicious); Use Data = yes/no response to question if Ishould use the participant’s data; O-E: WN = open-ended: explanation of why 
Ishould not use the participant’s data (if “No” to Use Data); AnonFeed = anonymous feedback; Re-Consent = participants provided 





Because my data were non-normally distributed, and though ANOVA is robust to 
violations of non-normality (Howell, 2013), I followed up my parametric analyses with non-
parametric analyses using the independent samples median test to increase my confidence in the 
parametric results. As seen in Table 9, the nonparametric results supported the parametric ones. 
In addition to the environment results, identity suspicion in Sample 3 did not differ as a function 
of gender cue in Steve’s profile, 𝜒2(1) = 3.53, p = .060.  
Table 9 
Non-Parametric Independent Samples Median Test Results Examining Effect of Social 
Environments on Identity Suspicion 
 
     
Identity-
Nonstigmatizinga 
 Identity-Stigmatizingb  Control 
Sample 𝜒2 df p  Mdn Q1 – Q3  Mdn Q1 – Q3  Mdn Q1 – Q3 
1a 10.08 1 .002  29.00 4.00 – 50.00  50.00 23.00 – 60.00     
1b 1.74 1 .187  29.00 10.00 – 50.00  38.00 16.25 – 58.25    
1c 10.59 2 .005  23.50 10.00 – 50.00  40.00 15.25 – 50.00  25.00 8.00 – 50.00 
2a 7.79 2 .020  17.00 5.00 – 48.00  33.50 9.25 – 50.00  20.00 8.00 – 50.00 
2b 6.18 2 .045  17.00 8.00 – 37.00  29.00 9.00 – 50.00  20.00 9.00 – 49.75 
3 35.11 1 <.001  10.00 1.00 – 22.00  30.00 10.00 – 50.00    
4a 14.01 1 <.001  21.00 7.00 – 49.00  40.00 15.00 – 50.00    
4b 12.41 1 <.001  30.00 10.00 – 50.00  45.00 19.00 – 50.00    
5 39.50 1 <.001  28.50 10.00 – 47.25  50.00 20.75 – 75.00    
Note. Study 3 tests only the main effect of social environment. Q1 – Q3 = interquartile range. 
aSamples 1a-4b = nonhomophobic environment; Sample 5 = Jewish tolerance. 




As reported in the main text, I measured several alternate identities in addition to being 
straight (Studies 1a-4b) or Christian (Study 5). Below, I present the results of these for these 
variables by study (see Table 10). It it important to note I made no a priori hypotheses about 
these results. On an exploratory basis, however, I note that the results for the perceived 
likelihood of Steve being gay (Studies 1a-1c) and bi or gay (Studies 3-4b), and for Josephus 
being Jewish (Study 5) closely match my identity suspicion results. Indeed, identity suspicion 
correlated strongly with ratings of the likelihood Steve was gay (.72 < r < .84), bi or gay (.78 < r 
< .84), and with Josephus being Jewish (r = .76). Taken together with the lack of environment 
effects on ratings of the likelihood Steve was bisexual (see Table 10) and the descriptively 
weaker correlations between bisexual ratings and identity suspicion (.36 < r < .65), the results 
support my application of Brekhus' (1996) notion of social marking. As described in my 
introduction, marking an identity automatically and passively creates a contrasting unmarked 
identity. In this way, social marking binarizes identity such that, for example, people tend to 
think of sexuality in terms of being gay or straight, while disregarding the various alternate 
sexualities that exist. These results imply that, while identity suspicion is still best measured 
using an actor’s claimed and unmarked identity (straight and Christian in my studies), it can also 
be measured using the contrasting marked identity.  
Table 10 
Identity Suspicion Ratings for Alternate Identities in Studies 1a-5. 
    Omnibus Results  NH vs. H  NH vs. CTRL 
      90% CI   95% CI   95% CI 
#S Identity Cond M (SD) F ηp2 LL UL  d LL UL  d LL UL 
1a Bisexual NH 41.20 (27.51) < 1            
  H 41.28 (24.56)             
1b Bisexual NH 50.17 (33.36) 1.30 .01 .00 .04         
  H 55.13 (29.51)             
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1c Bisexual NH 36.60 (26.29) 1.30 .01 .00 .03  0.18 –0.09 0.46  0.01 –0.26 0.29 
  H 41.47 (25.74)             
  CTRL 36.95 (25.24)             
1a Gay NH 36.99 (29.27) 6.16* .03 .003 .08         
  H 47.49 (30.66)             
1b Gay NH 28.12 (24.97) 10.42** .05 .01 .10         
  H 40.34 (29.51)             
1c Gay NH 34.77 (28.08) 3.05* .02 .0001 .05  0.27 –0.01 0.54  0.07 –0.20 0.35 
  H 42.15 (27.15)             
  CTRL 32.80 (26.80)             
2a Bi|Gay NH 34.84 (30.58) 2.45 .01 .00 .03  0.27* 0.03 0.51  0.08 –0.16 0.32 
  H 42.82 (28.74)             
  CTRL 37.27 (31.52)             
2b Bi|Gay NH 35.25 (27.61) < 1     0.18 –0.11 0.47  0.07 –0.21 0.35 
  H 40.52 (29.91)             
  CTRL 37.31 (29.65)             
3 Bi|Gay NH 23.26 (25.58) 35.70*** .08 .04 .13         
  H 38.07 (26.06)             
  GC 25.85 (24.48) 15.20*** .04 .01 .07         
  GNC 35.35 (28.24)             
  INT — 3.89* .01 .00001 .03         
4a31 Bi|Gay NH 34.82 (27.39) 23.96*** .05 .02 .08         
  H 47.06 (26.44)             
4b Bi|Gay NH 38.86 (27.87) 11.65*** .02 .01 .05         
  H 46.99 (26.92)             
5 Jewish JT 45.38 (26.55) 34.18*** .09 .05 .14         
  JP 62.80 (28.53)             
Note. NH = nonhomophobic social environment; H = homophobic social environment; CTRL = 
control social environment; #S = Study number; Cond = condition; LL = lower limit; UL = upper 
limit; GC = gender-conforming profile; GNC = gender-nonconforming profile; INT = Social 
Environment × Men’s Gender Cue interaction; JT = Jewish tolerance environment; JP = Jewish 
persecution environment. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
31 Correcting for a Levene’s violation, F(1, 463) = 4.61, p = .032, produced converging results, Welch’s F(1, 407.7) 




Following Curran and Hussong (2009), I created two variables to account for random 
between-study heterogeneity due to differences in study design. I conducted separate multi-level 
models regressing identity suspicion on social environment, each potential moderator, and their 
interaction, nested within studies so as to allow for study-level error variance (consistent with 
Costafreda, 2009). 
Though most studies in my dissertation are presented in the order they were run, Study 3 
was conducted after Study 4b, and Study 4a after Study 4b. Curran and Hussong (2009) 
recommend testing for history effects, so I created a variable in which I coded my nine studies in 
the order they were conducted. Neither this variable’s main effect, b = –1.15 [–2.68, 0.38], t(6.3) 
= 1.82, p = .116, nor its interaction with social environment were significant, b = 0.25 [–0.18, 
0.69], t(2458.0) = 1.14, p = .255. 
Across Studies 1a-3 and 4b, my description of Standard High as a nonhomophobic or 
homophobic environment included a statement about the ease or difficulty, respectively, of 
coming out as gay. In Study 4a, I removed this statement to test whether my identity suspicion 
results depended on its inclusion. Accordingly, I created a dichotomous variable contrasting 
studies with these coming out statements (–1) against Study 4a without them (+1). Neither this 
variable’s main effect, t(5.7) < 1, ns, nor its interaction with social environment were significant, 
t(2457.2) <1, ns. 
Given these results, I conducted my mega-analytic tests of moderation without any 
controls for random between-study variance. 
 
